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The main argument of this thesis is that NATO can be an effective post-Cold War 
alliance in preserving 21
st
 century security and stability through the conduct of its 
military operations.  In order to show NATO’s effectiveness in successfully preserving 
post-Cold War security and stability, this thesis looks at three interrelated aspects of 
NATO following the fall of communism and how these aspects may have affected 
NATO’s ability to conduct military operations during its involvement in various 
conflicts.  Rather than look at the wider concepts of NATO’s security role, I was 
interested in examining whether the alliance has been effective since the disappearance of 
the communist threat.   
The first chapter looks at the influence of U.S. strategic interests on NATO’s 
decision-making process.  However, I argue that the interests of other states and the 
organization itself within the realm of U.S. strategic interests can motivate NATO 
decision-making to conduct military operations.  The second chapter discusses a tiered 
system of NATO members—based on their political and military contributions—and 
whether those tiers impact the conduct of the alliance during specific military operations. 
I argue that certain tiers contribute more political and military assets to particular military 
operations than other tiers.  Therefore, these contributions can have a decisive impact on 
the outcome of two conflicts featuring NATO actions.  The third chapter investigates 
whether NATO’s adaptation to non-state threats in out-of-area conflicts was successful.  I 
argue that NATO’s ability to adapt to changing security challenges outside of its regional 
borders allowed the alliance to conduct military operations against non-state threats, 
which resulted in stable and secure environments on the ground.  
iii 
 
The various case studies confirm the paper’s argument that NATO is effective as 
a post-Cold War alliance to preserve stability and security through its conduct of military 
operations. The results of the thesis can serve as a guide for policymakers in favor of 
NATO’s continued role in 21
st
 century security going forward.  Lessons learned from this 
thesis about how NATO has functioned since the end of the Cold War to deal with 
various security challenges can help guide policymakers as they deal with ongoing global 
security threats from Islamic terrorism, as well as traditional state aggressors.  
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 The world has changed considerably since the fall of the Soviet Union and global 
communism.  Mechanisms created during the Cold War sought to counter the threat from 
worldwide communist domination, specifically the formation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.  NATO served as the bulwark in protecting 
Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
However, once the Cold War ended, NATO sought to redefine its purpose in the new 
global security environment.  Several observers believed that NATO was obsolete 
following the end of the Soviet threat and that it would have little influence on global 
stability and security.
1
  In response to these arguments, other observers argued that 
NATO needed to become a “global” organization and focus on threats to its security that 
came from outside Europe.
2
  This also meant that NATO would need to “transform” into 
a 21
st
 century alliance and rapidly respond to new unconventional threats from non-state 
actors.
3
  The alliance would support peacekeeping in the Balkans, counter terrorism in the 
Middle East, and save innocents from genocide in North Africa, successfully finding a 
role in the era of globalization and complex threats.   
The main argument of this thesis is that NATO can be an effective post-Cold War 
alliance in preserving 21
st
 century security and stability through the conduct of its 
military operations.  In order to show that effectiveness, this thesis looks at three 
                                                 
1
 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(03, 1994-1995), 7-14.  Also, see Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal 
Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (01, 1993), 3-43.   
2
 W. Bruce Weinrod, “The Future of NATO,” Mediterranean Quarterly 23, no. 2 (02, 2012), 1-13; Ivo 
Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (05, 2006), 105-113.   
3
 Kwang Ho Chun, “NATO: Adaptation and Relevance for the 21
st
 Century,” Journal of International and 
Area Studies 20, no. 2 (02, 2013), 67-82; Ivo Daalder, “NATO in the 21
st
 Century: What Purpose, What 
Missions?” Brookings Institution, April 1999, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/1999/4/nato%20daalder/reportintro; “Jones: 
Transforming NATO Into 21
st
 Century Alliance,” Sea Power 47, no. 11 (11, 2004), 28-33.  
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interrelated aspects of NATO following the fall of communism and how these aspects 
may have affected NATO’s conduct of military operations.  I have been a student of the 
Cold War since my undergraduate work and I have always had a fascination with NATO.  
Rather than look at the wider concepts of NATO’s security role, I want to examine 
whether the alliance has been effective since the disappearance of the communist threat 
by focusing exclusively on military actions.  The military aspect offers an instructive 
viewpoint on NATO’s 21
st
 century relevance due to the prominent position of armed 
conflicts in the alliance’s post-Cold War history.  For that reason, this work presents a 
meaningful contribution to the current debate on NATO’s future place in the world.   
The first chapter of the thesis explores NATO’s decision-making process and 
answers the question of whether U.S. strategic interests dominantly influences NATO 
decisions to conduct military operations. While some could argue that U.S. interests 
dictate and influence the alliance’s decision-making on whether to conduct operations, 
the chapter’s hypothesis states that other factors exist that motivate NATO involvement 
that reflect the interests of other states and the organization itself.  Mainly, this chapter 
argues that U.S. strategic interests are not absolute in determining whether NATO 
decides to conduct a military operation.   
The chapter examines NATO decision-making structures through the process of 
consensus-building. The chapter also delves into the influence of U.S. strategic interests 
based on the U.S. role as the hegemon.  However, even with considerable U.S. influence, 
the literature shows that other states’ interests and NATO’s interests based on the 
mechanisms of the organization itself had a role in deciding NATO’s actions in a conflict 
even with a dominant U.S. influence.  This chapter identified two case studies where 
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there was a significant U.S. strategic interest to achieve military victory: Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Through process tracing, this chapter highlights different NATO actions within the 
categories of U.S. interests, other members’ interests, and NATO’s interests to see if 
these factors influenced the outcome for deciding NATO military action.  The case 
studies confirm the hypothesis that other factors do have a significant impact towards 
influencing NATO decision-making to determine the alliance’s choice to conduct 
military operations in these two conflicts.  
The second chapter answers the question of whether a tiered system of NATO 
members impacts the conduct of the collective alliance during specific military 
operations. The hypothesis for this chapter argues that certain tiers contribute more 
political and military assets to particular operations than other tiers.  Therefore, these 
political or military contributions from NATO tiers can have a decisive impact on the 
outcome of two conflicts featuring NATO actions.  To answer this question, this chapter 
uses the ongoing argument of burden-sharing and the concept of the “free-rider” problem 
as guides to explain how specific NATO members—divided into three tiers—contribute 
to the outcome of specific military operations.  This question offers a different 
perspective on the burden-sharing argument and helps show future implications of a 
tiered member system in the alliance and its impact on future operations. 
The literature review examines the role and structure of alliances and then delves 
into the concepts of burden-sharing and the “free rider” problem and how they have 
impacted NATO’s functions since its creation.  While some observers highlight the 
existence of a possible tiered system, the analysis ranged in definitions and concepts.   
However, where this chapter deviates from current analysis is by determining whether 
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these tiers had an impact on how the operations were conducted, not necessarily focusing 
on the general concept of burden-sharing and its impact on the alliance.  To reinforce this 
argument, the chapter divides NATO into three tiers based on burden-sharing and shows 
that these tiers could have a significant impact on the conduct of NATO military 
operations in Kosovo and Libya. In order to investigate these cases and determine the 
particular tier’s impact on the operation, this chapter employs process tracing.  The case 
studies’ results indicate that the top two member tiers contribute more to the operations.   
 Following the end of the Cold War, NATO would use military force to respond to 
unconventional threats outside of the Western European borders, specifically threats of 
armed war between ethnic groups and the rise of Islamic terrorism.  The third chapter 
seeks to answer the question of whether NATO’s adaptation to non-state threats in out-
of-area conflicts was successful.  The third chapter’s hypothesis states that NATO’s 
ability to adapt to changing security challenges outside of NATO’s regional borders 
allowed the alliance to conduct military operations against non-state threats, which 
resulted in stable and secure environments on the ground. 
The literature review begins with the nature of non-state threats and then NATO’s 
evolution from its original charter in order to survive.  The chapter delves into the 
concepts of NATO’s persistence through institutional theory to explain its adaptation and 
then looks at how the adaptation occurred throughout the post-Cold War era.  While the 
literature review establishes NATO’s adaptation in the general sense, it does not 
specifically highlight how that adaptation to non-state threats through military operations 
may have contributed to stability and security on the ground.  The two case studies of 
Bosnia and Afghanistan seek to investigate and confirm the hypothesis of whether 
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NATO’s adaptation to non-state threats contributes to ensuring stability and security on 
the ground in these conflicts.  The methodology uses process tracing to highlight the 
specific NATO operations to determine whether the alliance successfully counters non-
state threats like ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and terrorism to provide security and 
stability in these countries.  The results of the case studies are mixed as NATO was able 
to provide stability and security in Bosnia, but was less successful in Afghanistan.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to show that NATO can be effective in protecting 
security and stability through military operations in a world that is far different from the 
one during the Cold War.  NATO’s value in the 21
st
 century will continue to be an 
ongoing debate.  However, showing the actions of its military operations and the effect 
that they had towards preserving security can be a good guide for understanding what 
NATO’s role should be as new and complex security threats from a resurgent Russia and 
the Islamic State will certainly test the alliance and its military capabilities in the future.   
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Chapter 1: U.S. Strategic Interests and Influence on NATO  
Decision-Making 
 
 At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies 
created a security organization that sought to deter the Soviet Union from further 
expanding beyond East Berlin.  In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
was formed and it served as the premier world security organization.  The United States 
has been a central member of NATO with its role enhanced since the end of the Cold 
War.  In recent conflicts, the United States has been involved in NATO military 
operations, particularly in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and North Africa.  The break-up 
of the Soviet Union, globalization, and the rise of Muslim extremism in the last several 
decades have contributed to an ever-changing world, forcing the United States and 
European allies to conduct joint military operations to maintain global order.  
This chapter will examine the complicated process of NATO decision-making 
within the scope of U.S. strategic interests, as well as to what extent other states have the 
autonomy to shape decisions, even in a U.S.-dominated system.  Specifically, this chapter 
will seek to answer the question of whether U.S. strategic interests dominantly influence 
NATO decisions to conduct military operations. While some could argue that U.S. 
interests dictate and influence the alliance’s decision-making on whether to conduct 
operations, my hypothesis states that other factors exist that motivate NATO involvement 
that reflect the interests of other states and the organization itself.  This topic is relevant 
because it can help show whether NATO’s decisions to conduct military operations go 
beyond the United States and its strategic interests and if other members have a voice in 
the decision-making process outside of U.S. dictation.   
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The first section of this chapter will look at the basics of NATO decision-making 
and its functions as a security institution.  The next section will examine the role of other 
states within NATO’s structure and how they influence decision-making.  Lastly, this 
chapter will study the influence of the United States and its strategic interests in NATO’s 
decision-making process.  This chapter will dissect U.S. interests, other states’ interests, 
and NATO’s interests in the alliance’s decision-making process and analyze the extent 
that these factors can influence how NATO decides to conduct military operations, 
particularly in the post-September 11 world. This chapter looks at military conflicts that 
demonstrated a heightened American interest and involvement to investigate whether 
NATO’s eventual involvement was influenced solely by U.S. strategic interests or other 
interests.  To understand NATO’s military effectiveness in the post-Cold War world, I 
think it is relevant to investigate whether the alliance shrinks under the pressure of U.S. 
strategic interests or if it rises to the occasion to take into account the interests of other 
member states and the alliance itself.      
NATO’s Decision-Making: The Factors and Rules that Determine Action 
To answer the question of how U.S. strategic interests factor into NATO decision-
making, one needs to understand NATO’s process to determine action.  Institutions are 
created because states have a vested interest in its actions.  Robert Keohane noted that 
international actors that seek to attain their interests will require “systematic and durable 
cooperation” and institutions will seek “to attain their ends, including increasing their 
shares of gains from cooperation, through the use of political influence.”
4
 To sum up, 
institutional cooperation allows states to increase their benefits in issues of international 
                                                 
4
 Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 274. 
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political importance. As an organization, NATO was created to defend Europe and 
maintain stability with a significant U.S. footprint.  The reason for U.S. involvement can 
be summed up by John Ikenberry, who argued that following World War II, “the United 
States saw its goals for Europe expand,” realizing that reorienting and stabilizing Europe 
was in its interest as the conflict with the Soviet Union expanded.
5
  However, according 
to scholar Ellen Hallams,  
NATO is a formalised alliance whose members meet regularly and work together 
through institutional structures designed to facilitate agreement and consensus.  It 
acts as a ‘consensus engine,’ whereby decisions are taken only with the agreement 
of all member states, unlike an ad hoc coalition, where states can opt in and opt 
out as they choose…Like a coalition, its members have come together for a 
common purpose and may offer resources and capabilities to that end, but unlike a 
coalition, there is nothing temporary or transient about the NATO alliance and it 




In addition to this idea, John Duffield placed importance on NATO’s 
“denationalization of security policy,” which means that the interests of the alliance have 
more weight than one nation.
7
 Duffield argues that the denationalization, which includes 
NATO’s “consultative organs, force planning process, and integrated military structure 
help forge a common identity among alliance members,” allows members to view 
operations in the interest of the alliance itself in addition to their own national interests.
8
  
Yet there appears to be a discrepancy between the ideal functioning of NATO and the 
theory of liberal institutionalism as the guide to cooperation in international 
organizations. NATO may have structures in place to “denationalize” the interests of its 
                                                 
5
 G. John Ikenberry, “State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America’s Ambivalent Economic and 
Security Multilateralism,” in US Hegemony and International Organizations, ed.  Rosemary Foot, S. Neil 
McFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 61. 
6
 Ellen Hallams, The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed, (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 56. 
7
 John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions after the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 (05, 
1994-1995), 775.  
8
 Ibid.  
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members, but NATO still functions as a cooperative security institution on the 
conceptions of its members’ own self-interests, which is a key point of the liberal 
institutionalist theory.9 Countries still view their participation in NATO actions through 
the guise of its own self-interests, which would go against the ideal concept of NATO’s 
functionality according to Duffield.  
Particularly, NATO’s actions in military conflicts are governed by Article 5 of its 
charter.  Article 5 stipulates the reasons for action.  
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area.”
10
   
 
However, for NATO to carry out operations, a decision-making process needs to be 
utilized that allows all the member-states to have a voice in the alliance.  The process of 
decision-making for NATO occurs on the basis of consensus.  NATO’s functioning 
capability is divided into military and defensive structures with the Military Committee 
making proposals for the military decisions, while the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
serves as the governing body that makes decisions on action by reaching an agreement.
11
 
The NAC allows for consensus to be reached when “no government states its objection” 
during the decision-making process, which does not include a formal vote on action.
12
  
                                                 
9
Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” 271.  
10
 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Accessed September 29, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm  
11
 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, NATO’s Decision-Making Procedure, by Paul Gallis, CRS Report 
RS21510 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, May 5, 2003), Accessed 





Like all the nations in the organization, they have an equal voice at the table when 
deciding whether to take military action, but all decisions require consensus.  According 
to Hallams, there are benefits to this structure because NATO can set expectations for 
behavior and maintain consensus in a way that is more structured and effective than using 
“ad-hoc coalitions.”
13
  The interesting thing about this is there is no strict interpretation in 
the Treaty where unanimity is needed.  According to Jack Vincent, Ira Straus, and 
Richard Biondi, Ambassador Theodore Achilles, an author of the Treaty, noted that 
“NATO planners deliberately left that point flexible so that the Council (NAC) would be 
free to act (as it rarely has) without consensus.  Nevertheless, the daily practice of NATO 
decisionmaking has historically emphasized unanimity. As long as there was only one 
real mission – to plan, prepare, and exercise together for joint resistance to an invasion of 
Western Europe – the rule of unanimity and the practice of consensus were considered 
pragmatic and not too damaging constraints.”
14
   
Over time, there has been a shift in the functions of NATO and the weight that 
NATO places on certain operations.  Charlotte Wagnsson stated that the evolution of 
NATO’s security structure and its strategic concept has allowed it to define itself based 
on a broad security understanding that is directed towards new challenges that fall out of 
the realm of the Article 5 governance.
15
  Rather than having a reactionary security 
structure, NATO has morphed from a strictly defensive organization to a security 
organization that focuses on maintaining security and stability rather than deterring 
                                                 
13
 Hallams, “The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed: The United States and NATO Since 9/11,” 53. 
14
 Jack E. Vincent, Ira L. Straus, Richard R. Biondi, “Capability Theory and the Future of NATO's 
Decisionmaking Rules,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 1 (01, 2001), 70-71. 
15
 Charlotte Wagnsson, “NATO’s Role in the Strategic Concept Debate: Watchdog, Fire-Fighter, 





 When NATO reviewed its strategic concept in 1991, it realized that the 
threats shifted away from Soviet aggression to matters that could cause instability in the 
region and greatly cause significant “economic, social, and political” consequences.
17
  
The post-Cold War thinking of NATO focused more on the rights of the 
individual rather than the defense of nations.
18
  However, the success of this shift did not 
come without a price that included the failure to effectively build consensus in a swift 
manner in order to deploy before a situation deteriorated further.  This was evident in 
NATO’s operations in Kosovo when the consensus-building process impeded NATO 
from quickly agreeing on target packages for bombing runs in Kosovo.  According to 
Hallams, “NATO’s ‘war by committee’ also gave rise to a series of operational and 
tactical weaknesses with NATO members finding it difficult to agree on a common 
approach during Operation Allied Force.”
19
 As I will discuss later, the other states in 
NATO had significant influence in preventing a consensus from being reached to conduct 
bombing runs in Kosovo causing concern on the part of the United States to remain 
involved in NATO for future operations.  However, in the end, this was how NATO was 
intended to function with all its members working to reach consensus on how to conduct 
effective military operations in order to have an impact on the conflict.   
Following the Prague summit of 2002, NATO’s transformation evolved even 
further to prevent this indecisive consensus-building from impeding its functions and 
alienating certain partners.  Out of the Prague summit came the creation of the NATO 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 487 
17
 Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.” International 
Organization 54, no. 4 (04, 2000): 718.  
18
 Rebecca R. Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World (Westport: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 41. 
19
 Hallams, “The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed: The United States and NATO Since 9/11,” 43-44. 
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Response Force (NRF), which “has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a 
rapid military response to an emerging crisis. The force gives NATO the means to 
respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving 
engine of NATO’s military transformation.”
20
 Rebecca Moore stated that this force was 
developed because the United States rejected NATO after the Kosovo operation, forcing 
NATO to reevaluate its capabilities and find better methods to become involved in these 
“high-intensity operations,” not Article 5 operations and actions that were focused on 
peacekeeping.
21
   
All these ideas are important in understanding how U.S. strategic interests can 
factor into NATO’s decision-making for conducting military operations.  Most 
importantly, cooperation is vital for NATO to be successful in its operations and there is 
an interest for countries to maintain the cooperation.  NATO’s functions and processes 
have an impact on decision-making in spite of U.S. strategic interests.  NATO’s post-
Cold War priorities that include the economic, political, and humanitarian principles that 
are governed by democracies have contributed to NATO’s shifting functions to become 
more of a proactive security institution rather than a reactive defensive institution.  While 
the United States does have significant influence over these actions, NATO’s governing 
structure appears to hold more weight when it comes to making military decisions.   
Other States’ Interests and How They Impact Decision-Making 
While the framework of NATO’s decision-making process allows for a consensus 
on conducting various operations, other states can still have influence over the process 
even with the considerable influence of the United States.  Following the end of the Cold 
                                                 
20
 “The NATO Response Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Accessed November 9, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm 
21
 Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 88-89 
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War, NATO foreign ministers, particularly those in Europe, realized that there was a need 
to build a “new peaceful order in Europe,” and that the “‘changing European environment 
now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace-
building as on peace-keeping.’”
22
 According to Hallams, after the end of the Cold War, 
there was a tendency on the part of the Europeans to handle their own issues without any 
action from the United States.  “European leaders were eager to demonstrate that…they 
were ready and able to deal with European security issues without having to rely on the 
[United States] for help.”
23
 The United States would eventually dismiss this eagerness 
with regards to the European Union (EU), but more on that later in the chapter.   
There can be a benefit for countries to be more involved in NATO than other 
organizations that may serve the same purposes for European nations.  One could 
immediately argue that EU has a role to play in European security and prosperity, but 
without the involvement of the United States in the security decisions of Europe like in 
NATO.  However, according to Rebecca Moore, there are more benefits to the power of 
NATO rather than the EU: 
Indeed, the argument that membership in the EU rather than NATO constitutes 
the ultimate prize ignores the fact that, to the larger task of consolidating a liberal 
order in Europe, NATO contributes two crucial commodities that the EU cannot 
provide: military power in defense of shared values and a strong link to the United 
States, whose military strength continues to be regarded as vital to the defense of 




Those two benefits place NATO in a league of its own when it comes to the significant 
impact the alliance has to promote the security interests of European nations.  It is also 
worth noting that NATO’s structures allow the organization to achieve greater success in 
                                                 
22
 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order, (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 
1996), 63. 
23
 Hallams, “The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed: The United States and NATO Since 9/11,” 41.  
24
 Moore, NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 67. 
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certain operations than other international organizations.  For instance, the Kosovo 
operation offered an example where “the EU…would certainly not have been able to 
accomplish what NATO achieved given their lack of military capabilities.  Furthermore, 
it could be argued that it was only NATO’s institutional structures and combined military 
capabilities that the alliance was able to achieve its objectives.”
25
 
While the EU may not have been the right actor for specific security missions, the 
European nations in their NATO capacities saw a need to actively engage in the 
alliance’s post-Cold war missions.  According to David Yost, in conflicts in the Balkans, 
European allies “were clearly interested in taking vigorous action—in practice, Operation 
Deliberate Force—to prevent a politically and strategically damaging outcome to the 
[Bosnian] crisis. Beyond the humanitarian concerns, US and allied leaders wished to 
contain the risks of the fighting spilling over to other parts of the former Yugoslavia 
(such as Kosovo) and to other countries, such as Albania, Greece, FYROM [Republic of 
Macedonia] and Turkey.”
26
 This could explain the reasoning for European involvement 
in NATO decision-making, but the Europeans also prevented consensus because of their 
indecisiveness on the targets for the Kosovo operations in 1999.   
While the United States may have significant influence in NATO decision-
making, it seems that other states like Great Britain or France also have greater influence 
in NATO’s decisions than some of the other members.
27
 According to Tom Lansford, 
“ideally the interests and opinions of each of the memberstates count equally.”
28
  The 
liberal institutionalism theory offers an interesting perspective here because the influence 
                                                 
25
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26
 David S. Yost, “NATO and the anticipatory use of force,” International Affairs, 83, no. 1 (01, 2007), 51. 
27
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that the other states can provide within the confines of an institution would allow it to 
achieve greater influence while utilizing the benefits of cooperation to achieve its goals.  
Steve Weber argued that even though NATO has been “distinctly nonmultilateral” 
through its history with the United States holding command of the decision-making 
power and responsibility, the functions of NATO are more aligned with the multilateral 
principles because it was created to provide security to the other members.
29
   
With this principle, NATO functioned as a method to take the interests of all the 
states into account, not just the interests of the United States.  Sometimes the interests 
would align, but they could differ at times and the United States would not necessarily 
hold all the weight. In fact, at times the interests of other states would diverge causing 
there to be a problem with the consensus-building process. As Galia Press-Barnathan 
stated, a “divergence” of interests on security could influence decisions that might not 
necessarily fulfill U.S. interests.  When it comes to European security interests, they lie 
within the realm of Europe and there is a difference in what constitutes a significant 
security threat for Europe as compared to the United States because Europe focuses its 
security on whether economic, social, and cultural aspects are affected.
30
  It is also worth 
noting that the interests of the EU do not factor into the consensus-building process and 
NATO decision-making.  As the role of the EU has evolved over the years, there was a 
need for further cooperation between the two entities, considering the common interests.  
However, according to the 2002 EU-NATO declaration on the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU and NATO have an understanding that they “are 
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organisations of a different nature” and they have a “due regard for the decision-making 
autonomy and interests” of each organization.
31
  Regardless of the interests that each 
organization may have in the other, NATO and the EU respect the independence of each 
other to make decisions that are in the best interest of the organization.   
As Duffield recognized, there was a “persistence of NATO” after the Cold War 
because it was in the interest of the nations to preserve an institution that continues to 
“perform a number of valuable security functions,” regardless of the differences they may 
have had with other nations about NATO’s purposes.
32
 While NATO continues to be 
utilized as a method to maintain security throughout Europe, Charles Glaser argued that 
non-security interests like humanitarian values could factor into NATO decisions because 
there is an interest by other states to prevent wars and reducing death and destruction to 
prevent damage to economic interests.
33
 Glaser’s argument could not necessarily account 
for a reason for U.S. involvement, but it could show that other states have interests of 
their own to maintain order or ensure security.  One could argue that this idea causes 
member-states to think in terms of the collective good when making decisions in NATO. 
This could potentially explain the issues in the consensus-building process to reach 
decisions on operations, which caused problems for the United States when NATO took 
military action previously in Kosovo.   
Stephen M. Walt had another way of looking at alliances and institutions, 
particularly through the perspective of a “unipolar world,” where the global community is 
dominated by a superpower.  Walt noted that “the condition of unipolarity inevitably 
                                                 
31
 “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Accessed November 27, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm  
32
 Ibid., 767. 
33
 Charles L. Glaser, “Why NATO is Still Best,” International Security 18, no. 1 (01, 1993), 15-16.   
17 
 
shapes the alliance choices that are available to different states.”
34
 He argued that 
“today’s medium and lesser powers” would align with the United States, because they 
want the cover of U.S. power to deal with regional threats.
35
  He added that a feature of 
unipolarity is if the unipole chooses to “mold” the political system to its image and play 
an active role in ensuring order, “it would inevitably be involved in many issues.”
36
  It 
could be argued that since the United States helped create NATO and mold it in its 
image, it sought to utilize cooperation while still maintaining significant influence.  Even 
as NATO has shifted away from the Cold War-era, the United States maintained an 
interest influencing the institution and sustaining a footprint in Europe, requiring the 
United States’ involvement.  
The Role of the U.S. Strategic Interests in Decision-Making 
While NATO’s structures and the influence of its other states have an impact in 
its overall decisions for military actions, the role of the United States is just as important 
to determining whether NATO will conduct military operations.  According to scholarly 
opinion, the United States is a key player in maintaining NATO’s relevance within the 
global order, particularly because it sees a vested interest in European security policy.  
John Ikenberry argued that institutions serve as a way to “help create a more favourable 
and certain political environment in which the leading state pursues its interests.”
37
  
During the Cold War, the United States had sizable influence in NATO’s decisions when 
deterring Soviet threats.  The United States had an interest in Western Europe’s stability 
and containing the Soviet Union.  The reason for NATO’s creation was to deter a Soviet 
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military action and if deterrence failed, NATO would defend Europe against an attack.
38
  
Ted Galen Carpenter argues that the United States viewed maintaining NATO as 
“crucial” because “the basic American interest in Europe is to prevent any power or 
combination of hostile powers from achieving a hegemonic position and thereby 
controlling the major industrial states of Western Europe.”
39
   
The U.S. role in NATO does not appear different from the original concept of 
NATO.  Global events have allowed the United States to maintain its power and 
influence. Also, it is in America’s interest to maintain a stake in NATO, because of the 
importance placed on international cooperation.  According to Stanley Sloan, “without 
continuing military cooperation in NATO, the United States and its allies would find it 
difficult to conduct the kind of coalition military operations that were so key to the 
success in the [1991] war against Iraq.”
40
  He then argues a point that, “ongoing military 
cooperation in NATO creates the potential for cooperative military intervention in 
situations that threaten peace, whether in or beyond Europe.”
41
 In the end, Frank R. 
Douglas emphasized that “NATO is the best institution and mechanism for continued 
American political and military involvement in the affairs of Europe.  It also serves to 
help amplify American prestige and perceptions about its military power in Europe and 
around the world.”
42
 As Moore explained earlier in the chapter, European nations saw 
NATO as “the ultimate prize” over organizations like the EU because it offered those 
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nations benefits, such as military power to defend shared interests and the link to the 
power of the United States.
43
 
The key point of the research question is to investigate how U.S. strategic 
interests impact NATO’s decision-making to conduct military operations.  It could be 
argued that the United States is the “single, strongly dominant actor in international 
politics” and it forces “collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international 
system.”
44
 Its interests and influence could significantly impact the stability of the 
international system, particularly within the realm of NATO decision-making. Glaser 
noted that in the post-Cold War world, NATO could not achieve certain responsibilities 
without American involvement, because it needs America to be successful.
45
 It seems that 
without U.S. involvement, NATO cannot be effective, which allows the United States 
greater ability to exert influence over other countries as the hegemon.   
According to Terry Terriff, the substantial military contribution of the United 
States to NATO continues to give it significant power.  Following the Cold War, when 
the United States “wanted something strongly enough, it could through consultation and 
persuasion, even including diplomatic arm twisting, convince the European members to 
agree. There has long been a general sense that where the [United States] led, the rest of 
NATO usually followed.”
46
  This also had an effect when the EU wanted to become more 
integrated into the security interests of Europe.  However, there was considerable 
disagreement from the United States to have the EU have its own role in preserving 
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security for European nations.  According to Richard Rupp, there was “skepticism” by 
the United States when the “EU wanted to draw on NATO assets in the planning and 
execution of EU military missions.”
47
  Furthermore, the United States saw the risk of the 
EU “duplicating assets” that NATO already had, thus potentially hurting the role of 
NATO in projecting stability and security in Europe.
48
 This is another episode that 
showed how the United States was able to exert its influence on NATO’s future actions 
and matters pertaining to European defense.   
If there was a moment that began the U.S. apprehension to using the NATO 
process for military operations, it was the Balkans campaign and the impasse with 
consensus-building, according to Hallams.  She argued that, “NATO’s mission in Kosovo 
in 1999 proved to be deeply divisive, as the politics of alliance decision-making once 
again exposed numerous schisms within the alliance.  Although ultimately successful, 
NATO’s operation in Kosovo left the Americans feeling distinctly weary of conducting 
‘war by committee.’”
49
  It is plausible to argue that the United States did not want to 
resort to a consensus decision-making process in order to get approval to conduct a 
military operation.   
While it is in the American interest to be involved in NATO, the United States 
wants to avoid being bogged down by the delay of consensus-building.  Hallams argued 
that “NATO can only undertake action when all its members are in agreement 
and…when member states cannot agree on a course of action, NATO becomes a victim 
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of its own institutional structures.”
50
  In addition, she argued that because of the “careful 
scrutiny of targets…it nevertheless created the impression of a divided alliance and gave 
rise to a determination within the Pentagon that for future operations ‘No one is going to 
tell us where we can and can’t bomb.’”
51
  In other words, the United States was not 
willing to go through this process again, particularly if the conflict impacted its interests 
in a more profound way than the peacekeeping missions in Eastern Europe.  In order for 
NATO to be successful, there needs to be U.S. buy-in, as well as from the other parties, 
because as liberal institutionalism stipulates, there are strategic benefits to cooperation.  
Most importantly, in conflicts where American interest was the greatest, there could have 
been a need for the United States to have assistance from its allies, including NATO.   
Methodology and Hypothesis 
 After reviewing the body of literature on NATO decision-making, it seems that 
United States strategic interests has a significant role in determining whether NATO will 
conduct a military operation, mainly because the United States is the most powerful 
member.  The body of literature reviewed also indicates that the interests of the alliance 
as a whole and the strategic interests of the other member-states can influence the 
organization’s decision-making to conduct an operation.  As evidenced in the literature 
review, while the United States did have significant influence in NATO decisions, the 
literature does support my claim that the interests of NATO through its consensus 
building process and other members’ interests motivate NATO’s actions in a conflict.   
NATO’s structures utilize mechanisms like consensus building and factoring in the 
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interests of other members can have an impact, even while U.S. strategic interests may 
still have dominant influence.   
If my claim is true, I would expect to see in my case studies that these other 
members’ interests and NATO’s interests would have a significant impact towards 
NATO decision-making on whether to take military action in particular conflicts.  For 
cases, this chapter will look at the post-September 11
th
 period focusing on conflicts where 
the United States had the greatest interest.  From this criterion and the results of the 
literature review, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are relevant because those were 
the two military operations where the United States was heavily invested.  If there is a 
case where one should expect a large influence of U.S. strategic interests, then these wars 
are it.  Afghanistan is of particular interest because the United States conducted this war 
to avenge the attacks of September 11, particularly because the Taliban-controlled 
government provided a safe haven to Al Qaeda for its attack.  In addition, the war in Iraq 
is important for examining American strategic interests, because it manifests the largest 
U.S. presence in a conflict in the last decade.  This chapter will use process tracing to 
investigate these various conflicts to determine whether NATO or other states’ held more 
influence over decision-making even within the realm of conflicts with major U.S. 
strategic interests.   
Case Study: NATO’s Role in Afghanistan  
Following the terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, the role of the 
alliance changed dramatically.  The United States focused its attention on avenging the 
attacks by conducting a military operation against the country that provided a safe haven 
to Al Qaeda.  NATO offered to help and for the first time in its history, NATO invoked 
23 
 
Article 5 of the NATO charter, which stated that an attack on one NATO nation was an 
attack on all of NATO.  While NATO was very involved in conflicts across the Balkans 
during the Clinton administration, it was the administration of President George W. Bush 
that did not see much benefit for NATO to have a key role in the U.S. plan to respond to 
September 11 with a military operation in Afghanistan.
52
 The United States chose a more 
“unilateralist” approach at the outset of the Afghanistan conflict because the Bush 
administration was frustrated with NATO’s lack of precision capabilities during the 
conflicts in the Balkans.
53
  
While this led the European allies in NATO to feel a sense of discouragement, it 
actually pushed NATO to transform itself to prepare for the looming threat of terrorism; a 
transformation that Hallams notes was driven by the United States, which still maintained 
strong commitments to NATO.
54
 However, while the United States was responsible for 
beginning the conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, it was NATO 
that took over management of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 
the United Nations in 2003.  In order to understand what caused this shift, I will examine 
how the United States advocated for NATO’s involvement following the initial stages of 
the operation and NATO’s decisions through consensus for involvement in Afghanistan.   
U.S. Strategic Interests 
Following the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter for 
the first time in its history.  However, while the charter stipulated that NATO would 
provide any assistance needed following the attack of a member-state, the Bush 
administration only sought to use NATO as a small component of a much wider coalition 
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to avenge the attacks.
55
  According to Hallams, regardless of the invocation of Article 5, 
the United States did not seek to use any of NATO’s structures or utilize NATO 
collective action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, only asking for 
contributions from member-nations that were “willing to engage in combat operations.”
56
 
Following the invocation of Article 5 by NATO, it did not take long for the United States 
to quiet speculation about a substantial role for NATO, particularly with comments made 
by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about whether NATO would take a role in 
planning operations to retaliate for the attacks.  Rumsfeld stated that, “‘the mission 
determines the coalition, the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.’”
57
   
Basically, the United States was telling NATO “thanks, but no thanks” to your 
offer for substantial involvement in Afghanistan.  An interesting point that Hallams 
argued is that the nature of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan was different from past 
NATO operations, pre-September 11.  She stated that, “Unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
where only NATO had the capabilities to mount a military campaign, following 9/11 
NATO was one of many options the United States had at its disposal.  Unlike in the 
Balkans, where Europe depended upon U.S. involvement and indeed, leadership, in 
Afghanistan the harsh reality was that the U.S. simply was not dependent upon NATO 
support.”
58
  This occurred because the Bush administration was concerned after the 
Balkans experience that if there was NATO involvement, the decision-making and war-
fighting strategy that was “clumsy and constrained” should not be repeated.
59
  Hallams 
                                                 
55






 Ibid., 60 
59
 Ibid., 61. Also, see Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order, (New York: Vintage Books, 2004) 
25 
 
further noted that the Bush administration had “disdain” for the role of multilateralism, 
particularly when the administration was determined to pursue its own interests through a 
unilateral approach, and this tactic initially worked towards America’s advantage.
60
  
Following this development, the United States conducted Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) through an ad hoc coalition, which allowed for a swift defeat of the 
Taliban through airstrikes and utilized U.S. Special Forces to train Afghani tribal forces 
to take over the country.  Even with its overall command, the Americans did not 
encounter much difficulty in conducting this operation in a rapid and effective manner.  
According to Tom Lansford, “the outcome of the military campaign seemed to confirm 
the utility of the American approach.  After the demise of the Taliban, one of the main 
lessons that emerged was that ‘a military hub-and-spoke command operation has worked 
far better for Washington than the consensus decision-making on which it had to rely 
during NATO air campaigns over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, which left many in the 
U.S. Defense Department deeply frustrated.’”
61
  After the victory against the Taliban in 
the span of a month, the United Nations authorized the ISAF to serve as an international 
peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul to assist with reconstructing the 
country.
62
  Due to America’s original inclination not to be dictated how it would fight its 
own war to avenge attacks on its soil, it was unwilling to use the structures of NATO 
decision-making to carry out operations.  The American ability to serve as a hegemon in 
the unipolar world allowed it to dictate terms on how NATO would utilize its footprint in 
Afghanistan and who would be in charge of the operational command in Afghanistan.  
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However, this go-it-alone strategy would come back to cause a negative impact on the 
American mission and push the United States into allowing for a greater NATO role.   
The United States maintained the lead in operations in Afghanistan, but the it 
encountered problems in its ability to effectively carry out strategy in the post-war 
environment of Afghanistan.  According to Hallams, “the greatest flaw in US strategy 
was that in their eagerness to commence a decisive and overwhelming military campaign, 
the Bush administration failed to adequately develop a post-war strategy for the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.”
63
  The inability of American leadership 
to understand the challenges in Afghanistan contributed to this failure, which may have 
caused a greater need for NATO.  However, Hallams pointed out that “only after the end 
of OEF and the setting of ISAF that the value of coalition and NATO contributions 
became apparent.”
64
  The United States recognized that using an ad hoc coalition from 
the beginning may have allowed “greater operational freedom and flexibility.”
65
  
According to Hallams, “only when combat operations were over and reconstruction 
began did the [United States] realize the utility of an organization such as NATO.”
66
   
After analyzing the process of American interests in Afghanistan, it is evident that 
the United States was valid in its reasoning to sideline NATO during the beginning of 
OEF.  The consensus-building process caused problems for the United States in the past, 
particularly during the Kosovo campaign and it proved to be a hindrance on America’s 
ability to exert its capabilities as the hegemon in order to conduct military operations.  
The need for a structured coalition that had the abilities and the resources provided by 
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NATO would have made sense to have initially if the United States understood the 
challenges that came with reconstruction.  NATO’s eventual involvement may have come 
with an American request to take on a greater role, but other interests did factor into 
NATO’s decision-making to take on the lead role for the ISAF.   
Other States’ Interests 
 According to Press-Barnathan, “immediately after the United States began its 
operation in Afghanistan, there was a real eagerness on part of the European allies to 
offer military burden sharing to the operation.”
67
 In addition, the European states believed 
there was a mutual perception of the inherent threats by Islamic terrorists, not only to the 
United States, but also to the Western world, and Europe was “eager to cooperate with 
the United States.”
68
  While NATO did not take a major role initially in the conflict, 
NATO member-states did offer bilateral assistance to the United States in its efforts to 
respond to the attacks, particularly assistance from Great Britain, France, and Germany.
69
 
Press-Barnathan argued that the reason for European involvement was that these 
countries wanted the United States to remain an active part of the NATO alliance, not 
only as a way to keep the alliance relevant, but also to restrain and influence the United 
States on its policies in Afghanistan.
70
  
However, as seen in the previous section, the United States was not willing to 
repeat the problems it encountered during the Balkan campaigns and since this was an 
attack on the United States, there was a desire for the United States to handle this 
campaign on its own.  Nevertheless, Press-Barnathan argues that the creation of ISAF 
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was a way for Europe to maintain involvement in Afghanistan operations and show that 
there was a positive “division-of-labor” strategy on their part, considering that the ISAF 
is a creation of the Europeans.
71
  Initially, major NATO allies had “rotating national 
commands” of the ISAF, such as Great Britain, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands.
72
  
However, the United States still had operational command of stabilization efforts and the 
ISAF only served to complement U.S. involvement in Afghanistan 
 Following the swift victory that led to the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
there was a role that the other states needed to play in the reconstruction of Afghanistan 
and prevent the country from becoming a terrorist safe haven again.  As the United States 
began focusing its attention on the looming war in Iraq, the role of the United States in 
Afghanistan began to lessen.  The interesting thing about the looming Iraq war was that 
there was tension between European allies in NATO and the United States, particularly 
over the request by NATO ally Turkey for the organization to invoke Article 4 in order to 
protect Turkey with deterrence aid if a war with Iraq was conducted.
73
 Article 4 states 
that, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened.”
74
  There was a schism in NATO due to the sensitive nature of discussing the 
potential Iraq war, but it allowed the allies to move beyond the heated discussion to 
tackle common issues like Afghanistan.
75
  It is fascinating to observe how the arguments 
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over one conflict did not serve all the states’ interests and galvanized the states to see the 
importance in cooperating on ISAF operations in Afghanistan to ensure stability.   
NATO’s Interests 
NATO’s invocation of Article 5 called for its members to act in concert to 
maintain security of its member countries.  This involved NATO sending assistance to 
the United States by patrolling the North American airspace, as well as patrolling 
Mediterranean Sea lanes to prevent potential threats from impacting American strategic 
interests.
76
 While NATO was not given a substantial role in OEF during its initial phase, 
the United States did utilize NATO for several small contributions, such as intelligence 
sharing and cooperating.   
In 2003, NATO took over operational command of the ISAF from the United 
Nations.  According to NATO’s deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo at 
the time, assuming leadership of the command in Afghanistan made sense, since the 
ISAF had already included several NATO members from their involvement in the UN-
mandated force and it also allowed NATO to have direct management over the conflict 
rather than its prior diminished role.
77
  However, according to Rynning, the substantial 
role for NATO began before it took operational command of the ISAF.  In spite of being 
sidelined by the United States for initial involvement in the operations in Afghanistan, it 
took on the role of “architect” of peacekeeping operations to maintain its relevance as a 
security organization following being shut out by the United States.
78
  In addition, 
according to Rynning, NATO’s ability to shift its strategy to utilize concepts like the 
NATO Response Force (NRF), that were developed during the Prague summit of 2002, 
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also “laid the groundwork” for its role as the architect of ISAF operations when they 
were able to take over command.
79
   
Specifically, NATO made the decision for itself to take command of the ISAF 
because it believed it now had “the ability to address new security challenges and take on 
new missions.”
80
  Most importantly, with the situation on the ground changing in 2003 
and the looming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 in various NATO 
member countries, “the allies knew that an additional effort on their part was required 
because the security situation remained unsettled and tense.”
81
  There was a need for 
NATO to ensure that the provisions in the Bonn Agreement of 2001 (the agreement that 
created the current government in Afghanistan and set up the ISAF) were carried out 
effectively and a force like ISAF was utilized to counter the Taliban.
82
  As evidenced in 
the earlier information, NATO became involved because it was in its interest to provide 
stability and take over the lead, particularly with the United States focusing its attention 
on Iraq.  If the situation spiraled out of control, it would have negatively impacted NATO 
and it was in the organization’s strategic interest to ensure that the country was able to 
achieve stability and continue to counter the Taliban.  
While the United States prevented NATO’s significant involvement in initial 
Afghanistan operations, it eventually advocated for NATO to take a role in the 
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan following 2003.  In addition, with the eventual shift to 
a different kind of mission, NATO as an institution understood that it needed to assist 
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with the stabilization efforts, because it was in their interests to prevent Afghanistan from 
becoming a terrorist safe haven in the future.    
Case Study: NATO’s Role in Iraq 
When studying the recent war in Iraq, one tends to remember that the United 
States had a unilateral approach of becoming embroiled in a military operation alone 
while dictating the terms for involvement by other nations in a “coalition of the willing.”  
However, while the United States did push for the war, other allies (not including Great 
Britain), and NATO itself did not want to get involved in the conflict because it was not 
in their collective interests to do so.  According to Hallams, “Between December 2002 
and March 2003, the transatlantic community became locked in a titanic diplomatic 
struggle, not only with Saddam Hussein, but also within itself, as the [United States] 
sought to lead the charge to war only to find itself facing significant opposition from 
many of its traditional NATO allies.”
83
 This battle between the allies could have 
destroyed the alliance.
84
  The fascinating thing about this case is that while NATO 
eventually became involved in the conflict in Iraq with a light footprint, other states’ 
interests prevented NATO from becoming entrenched in Iraq.   
U.S. Strategic Interests 
 As the United States was responding to the global war on terror, it began to re-
engage on the issue of Iraq’s intransigence.  The United States and Iraq were in a 
constant war of words and some infrequent airstrikes following Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait after the 1991 Gulf War.  The attacks on September 11 changed the thinking of 
American policy makers because the global war on terror gave the United States an 
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opportunity to finally oust the regime of Saddam Hussein by connecting his regime to Al 
Qaeda.
85
  As the United States took its case to the global stage, including the United 
Nations, it was met with opposition from fellow allies, particularly those in NATO.  
According to Hallams, the push for military action and bickering between the parties 
caused a “fundamental schism within the transatlantic alliance” because there were 
different perceptions by the countries on what constituted major threats to their 
interests.
86
  The United States focused on preventing Saddam Hussein from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction that he could use on American citizens and with the wounds 
of September 11 a year old, this potential threat was even more important for the Bush 
administration.  This caused global opinion to be mixed with some arguing that the Bush 
administration was using September 11 as a “smokescreen for putting in place long-held 
objectives” to finish the job from 1991.
87
   
Specifically, the United States had asked NATO to provide assistance to Turkey, 
a member-nation, under Article 4 of the NATO charter to deter any attack from Iraq if a 
conflict was to occur and U.S. troops would enter Northern Iraq from Turkey.
88
  The 
United States used this route to enable a role for NATO, because it believed that it was 
better equipped to provide support for Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq as a result 
of an American invasion. According to Terriff, “NATO was a perfect vehicle to provide 
the equipment and military personnel to improve Turkey’s security from the American 
point of view.  Alliance involvement would have no direct impact on the US military’s 
capacity to mount and conduct a large invasion of Iraq while sustaining a multitude of 
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  While the United States would go it alone, the future 
would still hold a need for alliance assistance.   
Following another swift victory by United States Armed Forces against another 
opponent in the region, America was faced with reconstruction efforts that were difficult 
to accomplish on its own and with its small coalition of allies.  According to Hallams,  
In the weeks and months following the end of combat operations, CENTCOM 
Commander General John Abizaid was forced to admit that the [United States] 
simply did not have sufficient numbers of troops on the ground to establish 
security and quell the mounting disorder.  Abizaid’s admission not only 
undermined any notion US troop levels could begin to decrease, it also reinforced 
the inherent weaknesses of operating outside of an organization such as NATO 
with its existing pool of troops and experience in peacebuilding operations.”
90
   
 
The lack of post-war planning contributed to this eventual admission and that 
certainly showed that NATO still had relevance with its functions as a security and 
peacekeeping organization.  The United States eventually saw the advantages of utilizing 
NATO’s role in this process and according to Philip H. Gordon, NATO had “experience 
with peacekeeping and disarmament, an available pool of troops, existing command 
arrangements and a proven track record of promoting defense reform and civil-military 
relations in former authoritarian states,” which would assist greatly with combating the 
insurgency, enhancing post-war construction, and easing the burden off the United 
States.
91
  While NATO did not provide military operational capacity to assist the United 
States in its efforts, it did support the training of Iraqi Security Forces. At the time, 
training the Iraqi Security Forces, along with the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, 
assisted with bringing more stability to the country and tamping down the insurgency.  
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However, while the future of the Iraqi Security Forces is certainly questionable after its 
failure to stop the rise of the Islamic State, one cannot discount the success of NATO’s 
role at the time to help ensure stability in the country.   
Other States’ Interests 
 Even as the drumbeat for war in Iraq grew louder with American overtures to the 
United Nations and its allies, there was significant opposition by other states to conduct 
military action against Iraq, including leaders of France and Germany, also two premier 
NATO members.  Most of the debate occurred in the United Nations as the United States 
sought a resolution that would authorize the use of military force to take out Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction.
92
  According to Press-Barnathan, there was a difference in 
the threat perceptions of the United States and its European allies.  “On Iraq itself, it is 
clear that countries such as France, Germany, and Russia simply did not buy into the 
argument linking Saddam’s dark regime with the ‘war on terror.’  American genuinely 
perceived a threat from Iraq, but Europeans genuinely did not.”
93
  While the United 
States and the other states differed on the threat perception, they also differed on which 
methods would work best for stopping Iraq’s WMD program.  France and Germany both 
argued in favor of “renewed [weapons] inspections,” which were a better way to limit 
any threat posed by Iraq if it were found in possession of WMD.
94
 As the United States 
made efforts to use NATO for protection over Turkey under Article 4, Belgium, France, 
and Germany resisted pressure to meet Turkey’s requests and blocked multilateral action 
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  The assistance allowed Turkey to resist any attack from Iraq and while 
NATO was not the vehicle for providing these assets, the deterrence was provided on a 
bilateral basis, which the Treaty does offer as an option.
96
  In addition, several of these 
countries had more to lose if America continued its aggression in the region, particularly 
France, because of its economic ties to the region.
97
 Most importantly, the other states did 
not want the United States to use NATO “as a rubber stamp for American policy.”
98
   
Regardless of the position of the other states and the push to include NATO in the 
initial operations, Great Britain was heavily involved in Iraq military actions from the 
beginning, since the importance their leaders placed on the “special relationship” with the 
United States.
99
  Terriff argued that in addition to Great Britain, there were other NATO 
members that supported the United States in its efforts, such as the “new” NATO allies 
and “those states recently invited to join the alliance” because they saw the United States 
as the “main provider of their security in Europe.”
100
  While there is no clear distinction 
by Terriff of these other nations, it is evident from the list of coalition members released 
by the Bush administration in 2003 that the NATO member-nations in the coalition 
included, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.
101
  While these countries provided assistance during combat 
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operations, the role of the other states in determining NATO action did not reach a point 
of contention again until 2004.   
As the war continued into 2004, there was an admission by President Bush that 
the United States needed NATO involvement to end the insurgency in Iraq caused by the 
end of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  However, as President Bush made the request, there 
was still opposition for an increased role for NATO by France and Germany, particularly 
during the G8 summit in June 2004.
102
  These countries eventually pushed NATO’s 
agreement to provide assistance to training the Iraqi Security Forces. However, there still 
was opposition from French President Jacques Chrirac who argued that, “‘I do not 
believe it is NATO’s mission to intervene in Iraq.’”
103
  It may not have been an ideal 
situation for the United States while it continued to be bogged down by the insurgency, 
but it did allow for NATO to provide help with stability by training Iraqi forces that could 
eventually take responsibility over protection of Iraq’s infrastructure.  This mission did 
not need to operate under consensus from the NAC and it seems that the opposition 
within the NAC was successful in blocking opposition to operational involvement in 
Iraq.
104
  The differing opinions on the threat assessments by Germany and France caused 
an impasse in NATO’s consensus-building. However, as I have examined, the interests of 
these other states and their apprehension for becoming embroiled in another Middle East 
conflict prevented NATO deploying combat forces to Iraq.   
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 The interests of NATO member-states had a greater impact to decide NATO’s 
course of action in Iraq than NATO’s own mechanisms did.  As I stated earlier, while the 
NAC sought to allow for an implementation of Article 4 to protect Turkey from potential 
retribution by Iraq for an American invasion, Belgium, France, and Germany blocked any 
action within the NAC for NATO to become involved.  Regardless of the action to try to 
assist Turkey, these three countries were vocal in their opposition to the war.  However, 
the opposition did not stand in the way of NATO eventually becoming involved.  
As a collective organization, NATO agreed to offer assistance to train Iraqi 
Security Forces.  Yet there was difficulty for NATO to join the conflict, due to its prior 
commitments in Afghanistan.
105
  Because of these commitments, NATO did become 
involved, but with a lighter footprint because there were calls of opposition from France 
and Germany, and also Spain to send additional troops to Iraq.
106
  NATO agreed at its 
2004 Istanbul Summit to offer training to the Iraqi security forces after the transfer of 
power to the interim governmental authority.
107
  In December 2004, the NATO Training 
Implementation Mission was succeeded by the NATO Training Mission – Iraq, which 
expanded NATO’s mission in Iraq by “providing training and advice” and established 
training centers for Iraqi forces.
108
 The training mission was under the “political” control 
of the NAC, but it did not involve any need for NATO to reach a consensus for action.
109
  
The ability to provide for this training mission and the mechanism that allowed for this 
mission to be initiated without NATO consensus was a positive development in NATO’s 
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light footprint in Iraq.  Nevertheless, it shows how consensus can still hinder NATO’s 
involvement in conflicts when it may be required that NATO provides a more substantial 
presence rather than training. 
 For Iraq, the interests of other states and NATO’s functionality prevented it from 
having a larger footprint in the Iraq war. However, even while the other states utilized the 
consensus-building process to impede any NATO involvement, NATO still had a 
presence in Iraq with the training mission, which did not need a consensus in order to be 
approved.   The interesting thing about this case was that the failure of the United States 
to understand the situation on the ground caused it to seek greater involvement from the 
alliance. However, its unilateral approach in the initial stages of the Iraq War may have 
contributed to the animosity between all the parties involved, perhaps causing the 
unwillingness of certain members to sign off on any combat operations.   
Analysis: Other States’ Interests and NATO Consensus Holds 
The case studies above confirm the earlier hypothesis that other factors can have a 
significant impact towards influencing NATO decision-making even within the realm of 
dominant U.S. strategic interests.  In fact, as expected, these two different factors have 
held even more weight in determining NATO’s eventual actions in these two conflicts.  
As discussed in the earlier literature review, the American role as the lead state in 
creating NATO allowed it to achieve significant influence in NATO’s structure, 
particularly during the Cold War.  However, the literature review showed the role of the 
decision-making process and NATO’s need for a consensus among the member-states in 
order to conduct military action.  As NATO evolved, other states were able to exert more 
influence in response to the United States while the structures held in determining 
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NATO’s eventual actions.  During the Kosovo campaign of 1999, in order to conduct 
airstrikes on potential Serbian targets, there needed to be a consensus by all the nations 
involved before airstrikes were carried out on specific targets.  Notwithstanding its 
successes, the consensus-building caused problems, particularly for the United States as 
there was concern that this antiquated process would hinder the United States if a military 
conflict ever directly impacted its own interests.  The interesting point about this choice 
was that the eventual consequences unilateral U.S. action caused it to eventually identify 
a need for NATO’s role in military operations going forward.   
            As mentioned earlier, the case studies were chosen as part of a specific time 
period and keeping in mind that these conflicts had the greatest level of American 
strategic interests post-September 11.  Afghanistan and Iraq confirmed that for decision-
making to occur for NATO, there needed to be other factors to determine action even if 
the United States tried to dictate the decisions.  In Afghanistan, the American interest 
provided for the United States to take the lead on military action and sidelined NATO 
from any substantial action.  However, NATO’s interests allowed the organization to 
invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which showed the level of importance that 
the alliance placed on offering support to an eventual mission.  Obviously, when the 
ISAF took over command of the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States realized the 
importance of using NATO to improve the strategic situation in the country.  ISAF 
eventually became involved as the need for NATO’s role changed, but also it was in the 
other states’ interests to reach consensus for action due to the strategic importance of 
preventing future terror.              
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The other states’ role in preventing NATO military action was fascinating in the 
Iraq case study.  During the lead-up to the war in Iraq, France and Germany played a 
significant role in blocking any NATO consensus for military action to support the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq.  That showed that other states’ interests still played a vital role in 
NATO’s eventual actions.  In addition, when the United States realized that it had 
committed an error by not planning for post-war reconstruction and tried to enlist the help 
of NATO, France and Germany blocked action again.  While NATO sidestepped the 
process by taking on a small role in Iraq, the organization never used military action in 
Iraq and that was prevented by the blocking of consensus.  
NATO would eventually provide training and assistance to Iraqi security forces, 
but did so without using consensus-building and without utilizing political control by the 
NAC to take action.  The United States could take a significant share of the blame 
because of its go-it-alone, unilateralist strategy, but in the end, the United States did not 
use NATO the way it was intended because of the U.S. aversion to the consensus-
building process. Nevertheless, in terms of NATO’s role, it showed it could still be 
effective with other states’ interests impacting decisions and then utilizing the 
mechanisms it created to decide on actions.  The decision then allowed NATO to deploy 
forces strictly for training purposes and not for combat operations in Iraq and it still 
found a way to be effective in a military conflict through the decisions it made to conduct 
particular operations.   
Conclusion:  
In the end, while some could argue that U.S. interests dictate and influence the 
alliance’s decision-making on whether to conduct operations, these case studies support 
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my hypothesis that the interests of other states and the alliance itself motivate NATO 
involvement in particular military operations.  The United States’ changing attitude 
towards NATO represents an interesting point in these case studies.  The evolution of the 
U.S. calculus moved from viewing NATO as irrelevant to its military interests after 
Kosovo to eventually seeing a need for NATO after getting bogged down in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  The United States needed NATO to be successful in these conflicts, which is 
interesting because history clearly showed that NATO would need the United States to be 
successful in the Cold War and the immediate European conflicts following the Cold 
War.  I would say that this is more a testament to the importance of NATO’s 
effectiveness as a security institution rather than the decline of U.S. power.  In fact, 
NATO’s eventual actions to assist in these missions may have served to provide a better 
outcome towards security and stabilizing the situations on the ground.  Whether there are 
flaws in reaching consensus, all interested parties realized the need to utilize NATO to 
achieve military strategic aims in a rapidly changing world.   
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Chapter 2: A Tiered NATO Member System’s Impact on the Burden 
for the Alliance’s Military Operations 
 
As stated in chapter 1, one thing about NATO remains constant: the United States 
brings considerable power and resources to the alliance given its size, economic and 
military strength, and “global policeman” role. The United States, however, is not the 
only member that is influential in NATO decision-making. France and Great Britain also 
provide power and resources to many NATO missions. These contributions, however, are 
not considered to be equal to American contributions. Since the Cold War ended, NATO 
expanded to include former Warsaw Pact states. Generally, these states have fewer 
economic, military, and other resources available than the founding members of NATO.  
NATO burden-sharing has been a subject of contention ever since the alliance was 
created.  With that, there has been the “free-rider” problem where some nations 
shouldered more of the burden of NATO than others, while nations that did not 
contribute as much still received the benefits that come with being a NATO member.  
Subsequently, the disparity in capability between the United States and the other 
members appears to have expanded, exacerbating the claim that the United States 
shoulders the largest burden in the alliance.
1
   
The gap between America and other NATO members’ resources has created a 
tiered participation system based on economic and military power.  Most observers agree 
that a tiered system exists. Exactly which members constitute each tier, however, has 
been debated. Some studies have argued that NATO’s tiers are based on level of 
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commitment to defense as part of a state’s gross national product.
2
  Other studies 
consider how states have publically articulated the future of NATO’s strategic directions 
to group members.
3
 Since burden-sharing is seen as the primary organizational tool of 
modern NATO, understanding how the alliance functions during missions, when one 
state is contributing more than another, is a central point for analysis.   
This chapter seeks to answer the question of whether a tiered system of NATO 
members—based on their political and military contributions—impacts the conduct of the 
alliance during specific military operations. The hypothesis for this chapter argues that 
certain tiers contribute more political and military assets to particular military operations 
than other tiers.  Therefore, these contributions can have a decisive impact on the 
outcome of two conflicts featuring NATO actions.  As NATO’s role in the post-Cold 
War world continues to be debated, a study of how the alliance functioned in recent 
conflicts and how the disparity between military resources is dispersed among the tiers of 
NATO members is important to determine if NATO’s system of member involvement 
needs to be reformed.  This chapter begins by examining how alliances function and how 
NATO fits into that mold. It then discusses the arguments of burden-sharing in NATO for 
recent operations. Also, this chapter investigates how the tiered system fits into these 
elements and whether the existence of the tiered system significantly impacted the 
conduct of operations.  The impact of the tiered system offers an interesting perspective 
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on whether the tiered system has future implications to NATO’s military effectiveness, as 
well as its relevance as a global security actor.   
The Role of Alliances 
 Global alliances—whether they are political or economic—are important to 
international politics.  Many prominent scholars have written about international 
cooperation and the role of alliances. For example, Robert Keohane believed that 
international cooperation “requires that the actions of separate individuals or 
organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with 
one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as ‘policy 
coordination.’”4 Keohane argued that this cooperation occurs after nations realize that 
their objectives mirror one another’s and there are benefits to working together on policy 
coordination.5 In essence, these actors then come together to form common institutions 
because they see their value to achieve successful ends for security, economics, or other 
issues.6   
Countries can benefit when they cooperate together to achieve common 
objectives.  Yet as Brian Rathbun pointed out, there are often caveats to achieve 
cooperation.  “State leaders will commit to qualitative multilateralism only if they believe 
that states will not abandon their obligations by either refusing to abide by procedures for 
dispute resolution or not coming to the aid of others in case of attack.  In other words, 
states expect reciprocity.”7  It seems that international cooperation cannot function 
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successfully unless there is a mutual understanding of trust and willingness to act to 
achieve the stated goals.  The obvious function of an alliance is to influence global 
geopolitics.  K.J. Holsti believes that, “all diplomatic coalitions and alliances have one 
common characteristic – they attempt to increase diplomatic influence on some issue or 
problem or create a deterrent effect by combining capabilities.”8  Some alliances like the 
United Nations are for peacebuilding, while alliances like the World Trade Organization 
are used for promoting global economic prosperity.   
When defining an alliance, there are two accurate portrayals. First, Stephen Walt 
argued that, “An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation 
between two or more states.  Although the precise arrangements embodied in different 
alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for 
mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of 
circumstances.”9  While Walt pointed out the textbook definition, he acknowledges that 
modern alliances have evolved into “social institutions that may involve extensive 
interactions between the member-states,” which is a little more detailed than the 
traditional World War I military alliance.  Robert E. Osgood stated that “alliances are an 
integral part of international politics.  They are one of the primary means by which states 
seek the co-operation of other states in order to enhance their power to protect and 
advance their interests.”10  Osgood and Walt’s definitions are most applicable based on 
NATO’s functions as a security organization.   
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Others echo similar sentiments.  Julian Friedman emphasized that alliances 
consist of the “pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel sources of action” and 
the “probability that assistance will be rendered by members to one another.”11  Another 
reason for alliance cooperation can be the desire to efficiently obtain interests.  Hans 
Morgenthau noted, “an alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation to an 
existing community of interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving 
them.”12 However, Glenn Snyder stated countries align because they want to “maximize 
its share of the alliance’s net benefits.”13  It seems that countries form alliances because 
they see the benefits of cooperation, but also do so to enhance their own interests abroad, 
for security, political, economic purposes. For the purposes of this study, I focus on 
security and political issues.  The functioning of alliances represents a good starting point 
to examine at how members function within an organization and contribute to the overall 
mission.  The next section captures the concept of NATO burden-sharing and its 
purposes, but most importantly it considers the argument of how it has significantly 
impacted NATO members since the alliance’s creation in the late 1940s.   
Alliance Burden-Sharing in NATO 
Burden-sharing can be defined as “‘the distribution of costs and risks among 
members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal.’”14  When 
determining how countries share the burden in NATO, it depends on the members’ 
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contributions in terms of military forces and monetary assistance to NATO’s common 
budget.15  From America’s perspective, three areas contribute to its views on burden-
sharing: “the adequacy of NATO forces, the equity of the distribution of costs among the 
allies, and the nature of each country’s contribution to collective security.”16  When it 
comes to burden-sharing theory in alliances, Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser’s 
seminal study An Economic Theory on Alliances—which discussed the collective goods 
theory of alliances—has many valid points on the concept of burden-sharing and how it 
impacts alliances like NATO. Olson and Zeckhauser measured that a country’s gross 
national product (GNP) was a good indicator “of the benefits it derives from collective 
security and its ability to provide for it.”17  It seems that looking at NATO states’ 
proportion of GNP, specifically on defense is a frequent way to measure each nation’s 
burden-sharing for the alliance.18  According to Olson, “member states independently 
make decisions about how much military force to provide.  That is, each ally decides on 
its own how much military force it will raise and thus contribute to the strength of the 
alliance.”19 While each nation can choose how much it contributes, it seems 
counterproductive to the effectiveness of the alliance if nations provide little in terms of 
military force in order to successfully complete a mission.   
Others argue that while NATO is a voluntary organization that provides the public 
good of collective defense, “nations will join the club and remain members so long as 
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membership is expected to worthwhile (benefits exceed costs).”20  The United States 
tends to be the one nation it is bearing more of the costs than its fellow members and not 
receiving any benefits.  This could be plausible since it provides the most significant 
contribution to NATO.  This has occurred since the creation of the alliance due to the fact 
that larger members, most notably the United States, “are bearing a disproportionate 
share of the burden of the common defense of the NATO countries,” while smaller 
members are devoting a minor amount of their GNP to defense than some of its bigger 
allies.21  As Olson and Zeckhauser argue, NATO’s purpose is to achieve a collective good 
for its members by defending against a common enemy, even though one nation may be 
taking on more of a burden for NATO.22   
In explaining why some nations contribute more to NATO than others, it depends 
on a number of factors.  Olson and Zeckhauser argued a nation’s assessment of its 
military force depends on its national income, but also on the proximity of that nation to 
an enemy, as well as the nature of the threat and the attitudes that country has towards the 
necessity of defense.23  They argue that smaller nations will see themselves as incapable 
of having a significant impact on global crises and they will be skeptical of making larger 
sacrifices than other nations.24 Olson and Zeckhauser stated there is disproportionate 
burden sharing for the larger countries in NATO that see value in its own public good by 
devoting resources to their defense versus a smaller nation that does not have the 
available resources, but also does not believe it can make a difference in the world.25   
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The main cause of friction results from the “free-rider” problem.  According to 
Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, the free-rider problem “arises when smaller allies rely 
on larger allies for defence protection, allowing the free-riders to ‘consume’ more civil 
goods and services.”26 The free rider problem can easily be identified when examining 
NATO resource allocation in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, the larger allies in the 
alliance, such as the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, were 
“bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of collective defence, so allowing the 
smaller nations to free-ride.”27  For the United States, the disproportionate burden sharing 
provides a problematic situation. This echoes Gates’ concern that some NATO members 
have turned into consumers, not contributors.  The United States joined modern military 
alliances because they “save costs and multiply benefits through the division of 
responsibilities, the sharing of common assets, or simply the protection provided by 
having a stronger country as an ally.”28 If the United States is expected to provide more 
resources than its European allies, the economic benefit of the alliance is unrealized. 
Economics, however, are not the sole reason why the United States enters into the 
alliance. Its involvement in defending Europe offsets some of the greater burden-sharing. 
Thus, while free-riders could be a problem, the United States is still involved in NATO 
because it sees the greater benefit of sharing assets.29 This gives the United States the 
opportunity to be further involved in Europe’s affairs, which may add to the U.S. role as 
the global hegemon, which was mentioned in chapter 1.   
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However, some have pointed out that because there are “political, economic, and 
cultural ties that link the NATO allies,” cooperation might be more likely to occur than 
free riding by particular alliance members.30  James Golden’s definition of the elements 
of burden-sharing in NATO is applicable here.  According to Golden, “the idea of sharing 
the burdens of collective defense normally applies primarily to costs in money and 
manpower,” which could include where to measure contributions based on the location of 
bases and the size of militaries on those bases, force contributions to NATO’s commands, 
and contributions to NATO’s infrastructure programs.31   
When looking at studies by Binyam Solomon and John Oneal, which include 
tabulations of the United States defense burden, there seems to be no challenge to the the 
United States from other NATO members.32  This begs the question of whether the costs 
are outweighing the benefits for the United States because other nations are not able to 
contribute.  Some believe that the United States “was practically a prisoner of its size 
during the Cold War” because it had the abilities to provide more to the effort to defend 
against the Soviet Union.33 In addition, according to the Olson and Zeckhauser theory, the 
United States’ size and wealth provide it with more to lose if the alliance is unsuccessful 
in its mandate and causes the United States to contribute more to the effort.34  Yet even 
while there was a need to contribute more because of its size, there was not as much 
reciprocity on the part of the Europeans following the Cold War.   
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Since the end of the Cold War, defense spending by the Europeans has dropped 
significantly.  They have consolidated their major industries, downsized their land forces, 
and cut spending.35  As a result, “European armies continue to lack funds for major 
initiatives aimed at reducing the technological and strategic transport and logistics 
disparities with the United States,” according to Brian Finlay and Michael O’Hanlon.36  
Finlay and O’Hanlon argue that even if these middling European powers wanted to 
deploy their own armies, they do not have the skills necessary to conduct operations in 
today’s environment.37  Because of the lack of capability, they are not even able to keep 
up with the demand of the alliance and the conflicts that require a response, leaving the 
larger allies to take more of a burden in the fight.  These burden-sharing theories are 
helpful in determining why certain nations contribute the amounts they do to NATO’s 
mission and provide a good focal point for my research as I look at whether these tiers of 
member states impact the conduct of operations in specific NATO military conflicts.   
The Tiered System Exists 
The existing literature shows how NATO functions as an alliance and the role of 
burden-sharing in NATO’s conduct.  Also, this literature is helpful as a guide to 
understanding the impact of specific NATO members on the functions of the alliance. 
Based on the concepts of the role of alliances and alliance burden-sharing, it seems that a 
tiered system of members exists in NATO.  Some studies have looked at NATO tiers 
based on how certain members view the role of the alliance.  Timo Noetzel and Benjamin 
Schreer stated that NATO is a “multi-tier alliance,” but one that looks at the various 
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interests of its members for how NATO should function.38  According to Noetzel and 
Schreer, the first tier consists of the “Anglo-Saxon allies,” who are “driven by ‘reformist’ 
ambitions and wants NATO to take on a broader set of challenges that include combating 
the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC), tackling the threat 
of nuclear terrorism and providing energy security,” while also playing a broader role in 
global security.39  The second tier consists specifically of France and Germany; the tier 
that Noetzel and Schreer define as the “‘status-quo’ oriented and skeptical about a 
‘globalized alliance’” members.40  Lastly, they view the third tier as a “‘reversal’-oriented 
tier,” which includes Central European countries that place importance on collective 
defense and fear the resurgence of the Russian threat to Europe.41  Noetzel and Schreer’s 
analysis is a helpful framework to show how NATO members view the alliance’s 
functions in the post-Cold War world.   
Some observers have actually used burden-sharing to identify specific member 
tiers.  In 1985, Klaus Knorr articulated that NATO consisted of a tiered system of 
members containing three classes based on member nations’ commitment to defense as a 
proportion of their gross national product.
42
  Knorr argues that “the smaller countries 
contribute least” to NATO’s missions, while the “second class is composed of “Britain 
France, and West Germany – nations that were great military powers not long ago” and 
of course, “the United States can be said to be in a class by itself.”
43
  NATO membership 
can be divided into two or three tiers based on various aspects of the alliance, particularly 
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the contributions made to member countries’ defense, their level of influence in the 
alliance, attitudes on the functioning of the alliance in the changing global landscape, and 
how the other nations measure up their contributions against those of the United States.   
David Auerswald has divided NATO into two tiers: the five most influential 
members (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States) versus every 
other member.
44
  Auerswald uses many similar burden-sharing studies as parameters for 
his work to determine these five influential members of NATO.  While Auerswald does 
create a NATO tier of the “five most influential members,” it seems it is for the purpose 
of his own work to determine why the five nations contributed to NATO’s Kosovo 
response.  The Auerswald study is useful because it uses burden-sharing as a guide for 
determining five influential NATO members and how they conduct themselves in a war 
of choice.  
The categorization of NATO members by tiers is not a uniquely scholarly 
activity.  Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates identified NATO as a “two-
tiered alliance” consisting of  
members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and 
talking tasks and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions -- between those 
willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, 
and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership, be they security 
guarantees or headquarters billets, but don’t want to share the risks and the 
costs.”45  
 
Gates’ comments seem to echo the free-rider problem and its impact on U.S. thinking.  
While this does not clarify which NATO nations fall into a respective tier, this is a 
thought-provoking premise and one that requires a little more investigation.   
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Methodology and Hypothesis 
The two concepts mentioned above of members’ views of the role of the alliance 
and burden-sharing together form the tiers of NATO members.  In addition, the 
categorization of members by tier is a useful organization and practical tool to understand 
NATO actions. The literature review and the concept of burden-sharing confirm my 
earlier claim that a tiered system exists where certain members bear more of a burden 
than others in terms of NATO military operations.  With this in mind, I expect the case 
studies to show how certain tiers may have impacted NATO’s military operations and 
influenced that operation’s outcome.  For the case studies, this chapter will investigate 
the 1999 Kosovo operation and the 2011 Libya operation using process tracing to 
determine if one tier or another has a greater impact on the conduct of operations.   
Since no single study has, to date, compiled NATO countries by tier for the 
purposes of evaluating activity within a particular mission, I have created Table 1.1 to 
better understand the tiers of NATO membership. Table 1.1 is based on analysis 
previously conducted by Knorr, Noetzel, and Schreer.46  In distinguishing the tiers, the 
literature clearly indicates that the United States is in a tier by itself, because it brings the 
economic and military power to NATO that no other member matches.  The second tier 
consists of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany because of their political heft, 
economic size, and military strength.  These four countries may not have as much power 
as the United States, but they still bring considerable clout.  The third tier includes many 
of the new members of NATO, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as 
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well as other smaller European nations that do not offer as much in terms of political and 
military influence.   
Table 1.1: Arranging the NATO Tiers  
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
United States France, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom 
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey  
 
This chapter seeks to use the burden-sharing element as a way to distinguish 
which members offered political and military contributions to a specific operation.  
Thinking about resources by tier, is useful to determine whether certain members offer 
significant contributions to the alliance’s function and the impact on a particular 
operation.  Based on the structure of NATO and the placement of the members in terms 
of tiers, I expect that the top two tiers will have the largest impact on the alliance’s 
actions in these two operations.   
Case Study: Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo 
Following the end of the Cold War, NATO’s role began shifting from being 
strictly a defensive organization to a proactive security organization that maintained 
peace in Europe.  The break-up of the Soviet Union created conflict across the continent 
and NATO found itself quickly involved in the former Yugoslavia.  In 1995, NATO 
conducted its first action during the Bosnian War, when Operation Deliberate Force was 
launched to degrade the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs.47  This operation proved that 
airpower could have a critical role in achieving political objectives, forcing the parties in 
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Yugoslavia to find a diplomatic solution to end the war.48 The Dayton Accords may have 
ended the Bosnian War, but it did not solve the ongoing ethnic tensions in the region. 
Following the Bosnian War, NATO’s attention quickly turned to Kosovo, a small 
territory seeking its independence from Serbia.  In response to Kosovo’s bid for 
independence, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used force to oppress Kosovars and 
ethnic Albanians, which resulted in armed conflict against the Serbians. 49  Since 
thousands of ethnic Serbians lived in the territory Milosevic did not seem willing to give 
up the territory.  Once the conflict intensified, the international community attempted to 
find a peaceful solution to the crisis, hoping to avoid a repeat of the humanitarian crises 
that occurred in Bosnia four years earlier.50   
NATO wanted to avoid being slow to take action against Serbian forces killing 
civilians and causing a humanitarian crisis.51  While a military response to Kosovo was 
necessary to reach a successful and peaceful conclusion, bombing was used as a way to 
force the Serbians to the diplomatic table.52 However, according to Ivo Daalder and 
Michael O’Hanlon, there was disagreement among the allies for even threatening the use 
of forces against Serbia to stop the bloodshed in Kosovo.53  The disagreement arose 
because of the risk level that some countries were willing to take to be involved in a 
conflict that may not have directly affected their geopolitical situation.54  NATO decision-
making on whether to conduct military action can be a long and arduous process.  In 
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order to reach a decision, a consensus needed to be reached by all the NATO members to 
take action for NATO’s involvement.55  This has often caused problems because the long 
process can have a negative impact on NATO’s abilities to conduct operations.  Looking 
at the countries that advocated strongly for action is a good indicator for identifying the 
tiers’ impact on operations.   
Tier 1 
 On March 24, 1999, Operation Allied Force (OAF) began to stop the Serbian 
onslaught on Kosovo. Initially, the operation included military assets mostly from the 
United States and Great Britain, or as Daalder and O’Hanlon explain, “an air armada that 
closely resembled that used for Operation Desert Fox, the four-day U.S.-British bombing 
of Iraq in December 1998.”56 The first wave of 350 NATO aircraft included 220 
American aircraft, which was a good indicator of the burden that the United States would 
bring to this operation, since U.S. aircraft and personnel eventually comprised one-third 
of the total aircraft used for the operation.57  Ultimately, the United States contributed 62 
percent of the bombing sorties for the air strikes in OAF, which was about 60 percent 
ahead of the second biggest contributor, France.58   
According to David Auerswald, the U.S. ability to contribute comes back to this 
idea of burden-sharing by countries based on the level they contribute to their national 
defense.  Auerswald explains that, “the U.S. was by far the most powerful nation in terms 
of both GDP and military spending before the conflict.  Indeed, American GDP was 
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significantly larger than the combined total for the other four [influential] nations.”59  
Because it had the capabilities to do so, the United States provided the greatest amount of 
military support to the alliance for the operation.  In terms of economic support, Patricia 
Weitsman says that the United States provided $3.1 billion in funds for the operation, 
given all of its military material contributions.60  Additionally, the command structure 
was led by the Americans with Army General Wesley Clark as Supreme Allied 
Commander of NATO and Air Force Lt. General Michael Short leading air operations.61   
However, while it did provide the material support and considerable financial 
support to NATO overall, American political support was lower than other nations 
involved in the operation.  According to Auerswald, “U.S. public support for the NATO 
campaign remained at or above 60 percent until a few days after the NATO summit, at 
which point support declined into the 50s for the remainder of the conflict.”62  Yet the 
U.S. government still strongly supported the air campaign, particularly to continue the air 
strikes without any interruptions for negotiations.63 However, there was hesitancy to get 
further involved, particularly with the use of ground forces.  According to the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States did not share the long-term 
risks with other allies and was not willing to provide ground forces to achieve victory.64 
Also, the Clinton administration had to deal with political opposition from Congress.  At 
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the time, Congress voted to refuse any funding to send U.S. ground troops to the region, 
while also reaching a stalemate with a tied vote on a resolution that expressed support for 
the overall campaign.65   
Given all these factors and its large share of the burden, the United States was 
able to influence NATO to not use ground forces throughout the entire campaign.  
Auerswald points out that of the five most influential members of NATO involved in the 
conflict, the United States provided the second least amount of public support for the 
operation, just ahead of Italy.66  Yet even with these factors, the United States still took 
on a large share of the burden in the operation and had a significant impact on the 
outcome.   
Tier 2 
Great Britain was the strongest advocate for using force in Kosovo.  At the time, 
Great Britain believed that the only way to change Milosevic’s calculus on Kosovo was 
through armed intervention, which went as far as suggesting the use of ground forces to 
stop Milosevic; a tactic that many NATO members – including the United States – were 
not willing to sign off on.67  Another way to look at Great Britain’s involvement would be 
that they took on the burden of the political involvement in NATO to move the alliance to 
take military action.  In fact, a CRS report agrees with this assessment, arguing that Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s government “provided the key political leadership” for the 
operation, particularly through its calls for ground forces when the air campaign was not 
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as successful.68 At the time, the Blair government viewed Kosovo as a threat to its 
national interests because the conflict could potentially spread to other areas in the 
Balkans.69 Great Britain provided the second largest number of planes to the effort 
(behind the United States), but they also flew the third most sorties with 1,008 missions.70  
For the nation that was the most vocal for action, they did not contribute as much 
militarily as France and the United States.  
France provided significant material support to the air campaign, as it was the 
second largest contributor to the air strikes behind the United States, flying 2,414 
sorties.71 This is interesting because France had not been heavily involved in the military 
command structure of NATO since President Charles De Gaulle ended their involvement 
in 1966.72 France’s support for the air campaign started well before the operation began, 
as they were publicly “in favor of an uninterrupted and escalating air campaign.”73  This 
could be attributed to the threat that France saw from the crisis to its national interests, 
mainly because of the proximity of the Balkans to France’s borders.74  France contributed 
over 100 aircraft to the operation and they contributed the most in terms of sophisticated 
munitions.75  
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While Great Britain very actively pushed for NATO to become involved in the 
conflict, other members of the second tier expressed their reservations with the use of 
force by NATO.  Germany and Italy expressed concern at one point on if NATO had any 
legal authority to respond to the violence in Kosovo.76  In fact, Italy and Germany faced 
considerable public pressure from its citizens to avoid involvement in the conflict.77  
Germany wanted to end the conflict as soon as possible and it strongly advocated for 
ceasefires to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis.78  However, despite the public 
pressure, Germany still contributed to the air campaign, flying 636 sorties throughout 
OAF.79  Italy may have expressed opposition to the mission, because of the economic 
costs it could impose on the country.80  Yet, most of the missions were actually flown out 
of Italian bases, while some aircraft did originate from U.S. and British bases, but half of 
the aircraft used for the entire operation were actually based at Italian bases.81 Also, the 
Italian Air Force flew the fourth largest number of sorties during the campaign.82  In the 
end, it seems that Great Britain and France together shouldered the second biggest burden 
after the United States.  While not as powerful as the United States, France and Great 
Britain had the political and military capabilities to impact the conduct of the operation.   
Tier 3 
In terms of the other members of NATO, at the time there were not as many 
countries that were members of the organization.  However, a new group of former 
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Warsaw Pact countries had just become members of the alliance and took on a role – 
albeit a small one – in OAF.  The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (also known as 
the Visegrad countries) became NATO members just days before OAF began.83  As they 
were still getting their bearings, OAF became an immediate test of their commitment to 
the alliance.  Ryan Hendrickson argues that “most analysts recognized that the Visegrad 
states would be unable to contribute militarily to the alliance in a meaningful way for 
some years, but there was little doubt in most analysts’ minds about these states’ 
commitment to the alliance.”84  Poland provided the most diplomatic and military support 
to the operation of the Visegrad countries.  Polish public opinion favored airstrikes 
against Serbia with 63 percent of the public supporting the operation, resulting in stronger 
political support.85  Militarily, Poland contributed a contingency of infantry to protect 
NATO forces and leaders operating in Albania.86  According to Hendrickson, Poland’s 
minor contributions soon after it became a member left no doubt about its commitment to 
the alliance.87 
While the Czech Republic expressed political support for the NATO air strikes 
and opposed Milosevic’s actions, public opinion was against participation.  At the time, 
“50 percent of the public stated that they opposed the bombings, while only 30 percent 
backed the operation,” which then followed with public protests throughout the course of 
the operation.88  The Czech Republic did not provide any military assistance and it did 
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not formally approve the use of its country for NATO to launch air strikes.89  There is 
really no clear reasoning to the Czech Republic’s opposition, as stated by Milada A. 
Vachudova.  She argues that, “the war did not have any repercussions for the Czech 
Republic, such as economic loss, regional instability, or the risk of the influx of refugees, 
which might explain such a hostile political reaction.”90   
On the other hand, Hungary encountered the difficulty of its proximity to Serbia, 
as well as the complexity of a population of ethnic Hungarians residing there and its 
people were unwilling to fight under a NATO flag against fellow Hungarians in Serbia.91 
In addition, public opinion contributed to the lack of political support as 45 percent of the 
population opposed OAF prior to its start.92  Yet even with its reservations for direct 
involvement, Hungary provided strategic military support to the alliance by allowing 
plans to use its airspace to fly through for the air strikes.  This action was critical in 
allowing NATO to take out key Serbian targets.  As the operation progressed, Hungarian 
public support began to shift as 65 percent of the public supported the air strikes.93   
The other smaller allies contributed in a varying degree ranging from providing 
aircraft to assisting in peacemaking efforts.  For example, the Netherlands contributed 18 
aircraft to the operation, while Canada contributed 18 CF-18 fighter bombers to the 
mission.94 Other smaller aspiring NATO countries at the time, like Bulgaria and Romania 
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approved airspace usage for NATO to conduct operations.95  Greece had significant 
public opposition to the operation – close to 90 percent.96  Yet while Greece withheld 
participation in OAF, it contributed to the peacemaking effort and the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) following OAF.97  “Tier 3” seems less involved that the first two tiers; however, 
even with small contributions, “tier 3” had a positive impact on the operation.   
Case Study: Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya 
Ten years had passed since NATO last used air power to impact a civil war in 
another country.  In 2011, NATO went even further out of its area of operations to 
prevent Muammar Qaddafi’s forces from slaughtering the Libyan rebels in Benghazi.  
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya shows how NATO collaborated to topple 
Qaddafi and free Libya.  This operation was the first appearance of the “leading from 
behind” concept for the United States as it took a minimal role in the operation compared 
to Great Britain and France.98  In addition, NATO expanded since OAF as many new 
allies joined the organization and many non-NATO members provided assistance to the 
operation.  Yet as said best by Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, “the United States, 
the most powerful military actor within NATO, decided to play only a supporting role, 
forcing some European allies, predominantly France and Britain, to take the lead.”99  
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They further argued that this action by the United States showcased the burden-sharing 
concept in NATO, as well as a NATO without the United States as the lead actor.100   
After Qaddafi used violence to respond to the rebel uprising, the United Nations 
Security Council responded with sanctions and arms embargoes to prevent Qaddafi’s 
forces from gaining further materials to kill civilians.101  Those measures led to the 
passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for all measures to be 
taken to protect civilians and included the provision of a no-fly zone against Qaddafi’s 
forces.102  UN Security Council Resolution 1973 codified NATO military actions against 
Libya.  Following passage of the resolution, the United States and two members of “tier 
2” (Great Britain and France) conducted the initial air strikes against Qaddafi’s force to 
prevent them from reaching Benghazi in Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD).  Given the 
success of the initial operation and the desire for the United States to minimize its 
involvement, President Barack Obama sought NATO’s support to command enforcement 
of the UN Security Council Resolution and imposing the no-fly zone in Libya.103  
According to Ivo Daalder and Admiral James Stavridis, NATO was the right choice to 
assume command given the countries that were involved in the operation because “with 
many NATO countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, already 
contributing to the intervention, NATO was the logical choice to assume command, and 
it agreed to do so on March 27.”104   
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However, according to Jeffrey Michaels, there were reservations from certain 
NATO members to even take control of the campaign, as well as concerns if NATO was 
not involved.   
Initially, France did not want NATO participation on the grounds that this would 
undermine Arab support[,but they eventually agreed to it].  Additionally, German 
officials suggested non-military options such as target sanctions and other forms 
of diplomatic pressure.  Turkish leaders cast doubt on the motives behind Western 
intervention, suggesting that action was driven by oil and mineral wealth rather 
than a desire to protect the Libyan people…Conversely, there were also problems 
with not having NATO in charge.  For instance, the Norwegians were reluctant to 
participate in a non-NATO mission, and Italy issued a veiled threat to withdraw 
the use of its bases unless the Alliance was put in charge.105 
 
A smaller number of NATO countries actually took part in OUP than OAF.  While some 
“tier 2” members shouldered a greater burden and the United States scaled back its 
involvement, many of the “tier 3” members did not contribute any military, financial, or 
political support to the operation.  OUP included “only 14 out of 28 members [that] 
contributed military assets and only six European nations (Britain, France, Belgium, 
Italy, Norway and Denmark) contributed to the strike mission—and one of those 
(Norway) pulled out of the air strikes.”106 NATO relied on “tier 2” more, as well as non-
NATO members to contribute to the overall air campaign.  
Tier 1 
Even though the United States had an early role with support for the UN Security 
Council resolution and its initial involvement in OOD, it sought to step back and enable 
NATO to lead the air campaign.  However, even with its commitment declining, 
“Washington would continue to participate in military operations but would do so mainly 
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by gathering and analyzing intelligence, refueling NATO and partner aircraft, and 
contributing other high-end military capabilities, such as electronic jamming.”107  
President Obama argued that scaling back American involvement would ensure “‘the risk 
and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced 
significantly.’”108  According to Hallams and Schreer, this action reflected a change in 
America’s position on NATO burden-sharing, meaning that the “limited nature of U.S. 
interests’ dictated a constrained response.”109  As part of this new strategy, the United 
States withheld certain military materials from NATO for the operation.  That included 
A-10 Thunderbolt II and AC-130 Spectre gunships, which have a critical role in 
providing air cover to ground troops conducting precision operations.110   
In terms of the raw numbers, the United States contributed 75 percent of all aerial 
refueling sorties, 70 percent of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 24 
percent of the total aircraft, and 27 percent of the total sorties flown for the actual 
operation, which does include the refueling sorties.111  Even though the United States did 
not partake in the bombing runs for OUP, it still had a substantial role to enable the other 
members to carry out the strikes.  One could make the argument that the United States 
may not have contributed much to the actual war-fighting effort, but that the European 
allies could not necessarily complete some of the missions without the refueling aircraft 
and the ISR for the targets.  In the end, it seems that the United States withheld 
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substantial military support because of domestic politics, but it allowed other NATO 
members to take on the necessary burden.   
Tier 2 
 Of all the “tier 2” members, Great Britain and France pushed for the air campaign 
in Libya the most, while countries like Germany publicly criticized the operation and did 
not contribute to the air campaign.112  It is important to note that this was the first NATO 
operation that France was reintegrated back into the NATO command structure after a 
43-year absence.113  Great Britain and France’s two leaders began lobbying for 
intervention, taking a more hawkish stance than other NATO members.114  Great Britain 
and France then joined the United States in leading the passing of the Security Council 
resolution while Germany abstained.115   
France’s initial involvement could be explained by the political ramifications 
from conflict so close to its borders, which contributed to the strength of its political 
support and its involvement in the air campaign.116  Even when there was public 
opposition to France’s involvement, it did not impact President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
hawkish views.  Initially, the French people did not want NATO to become involved in 
the operation for fear of alienating the Arab nations.117  Despite the French people’s 
initial opposition to NATO’s command of the operation, the country still took a lead in 
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the operation.  France’s involvement in the operation included the deploying of 3,100 
sorties, which accounted for 32 percent of the overall sorties during the operation.118 The 
French contributed the largest amount of “tier 2” military support in what became known 
as “Sarkozy’s War,” due to his intense lobbying for intervention.119 
The initial political support from Great Britain included the push for UN Security 
Council resolution to respond to the humanitarian crisis.  Reports from British journalists 
argue that Prime Minister David Cameron was influenced by the West’s failure to 
respond to Srebrenica in 1995 that saw 8,000 civilians slaughtered.120  The historical 
influence on Britain’s leaders contributed to the vocal political response for intervention.  
However, while the British public opposed involvement, it did not seem to impact 
Cameron’s drive to intervene.  Other than the United States pushing for NATO 
involvement after OOD, “the British were the lone outliers, wanting the operation to take 
place under NATO auspices and utilizing NATO command and control systems.”121  In 
terms of military support for OUP, Great Britain contributed 3,000 air sorties, which 
would place it as the second largest contributor behind France.122  They also sent in 
special forces to liaise with the Libyan rebels, exhibiting their commitment to impact the 
ground situation.123 In the end, Great Britain believed it was in its national interest to 
intervene and it showed from Cameron’s actions to publicly push for an operation.  A key 
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conclusion is that “tier 2” countries like France and Great Britain “were willing to ‘step 
up’ and take on a greater share of the burden.”124  Hallams and Schreer argue that this 
represented a shift in the European members’ thinking and those members “can and will 
use force when they have the political will to do so.”125 
Germany was not as willing to support the operation as some of its fellow “tier 2” 
allies.  Some have explained that Germany’s unwillingness to even participate in 
campaigns like these is due to its post-World War II culture of restraint, particularly on 
military matters.126 One could argue that this factored into Germany’s minimal 
involvement in Kosovo. Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that “the no fly-zone idea was 
potentially dangerous.”127  The initial anxiety behind the Germany’s lack of political 
support stemmed from a concern that the military action supporting OUP would not be 
supported by the German public.128 Also, there was suspicion from Germany towards the 
motives of the key allies pushing for military intervention: France and Great Britain.129  
Merkel believed Sarkozy was motivated by his upcoming election to show strength, 
which caused him to favor intervention.130  Nevertheless, Germany followed a similar 
pattern as in Kosovo and withheld any action for this operation.  
Another “tier 2” country that did not get as involved was Italy.  The Italians 
offered mild support for the operation and gave limited contributions to the air campaign.  
Most of its contributions were through enforcement of the arms embargo on Qaddafi and 
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giving NATO access to seven air bases for launching strikes.131  The reasons for their 
hesitancy to participate in the operation directly appear to result from their economic ties 
with Libya.132  According to Bloomberg, prior to the intervention, Italy’s trade with Libya 
was over 12 billion Euros; so it would be difficult for any country to go to war against a 
country with this type of trade partnership.133   Public opinion factored into their decision-
making as well because only 40 percent of Italians polled in April 2011 favored 
intervention in Libya.134  However, Christian Anrig noted that, Italy offered some small 
level of support through “reportedly enforcing the no-fly zone” with eight combat 
aircraft.135  And even with the lack of political support for the operation, Italy still utilized 
drones and other combat materials for ISR through a joint venture with the United 
States.136  A month after that April poll, public opinion shifted to 52 percent of Italians 
supporting intervention, which could explain the change in Italy’s thinking.137  
In the end, the “tier 2” countries contributed to the operation based on a variety of 
public, political, and military support.  The political support mostly came from Great 
Britain and France, while Germany expressed opposition to the operation.  Great Britain 
and France contributed about two-thirds of the strike sorties, while Italy contributed one-
third, due to its contribution of eight aircraft to the operation.138  Based on the 
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contributions, the “tier 2” countries stepped up as the major players to conduct the 
operation in Libya.   
Tier 3 
 Mark Laity attributes the lesser involvement of the third tier members to the fact 
that “only the richest nations of the Alliance…can afford the full spectrum of military 
capabilities.”139  Only six alliance members contributed to the NATO air campaign and 
Denmark, Canada, and Norway were the involved “tier 3” nations.  Canada contributed 
six CF-18 planes and two tanker aircraft, while engaging targets in Misrata early in the 
campaign.140  Yet it is interesting to see how that some smaller countries took on a greater 
burden while others did not.  Some of the stronger military countries in the alliance like 
Turkey, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain were reluctant to offer any military or 
political support to the mission.141  In particular, Poland and the Netherlands may have 
been active during OAF in Kosovo, but did not offer as much support for OUP. In terms 
of the Netherlands, Anrig argues Dutch policy shifted from being proactive in NATO 
operations.142  Poland did not participate at all in the campaign, which can be attributed to 
the close diplomatic ties it had with Qaddafi following the destruction of his nuclear 
weapons and willingness to become a member of the international community.143  
Poland’s actions starkly contrasted to its involvement in Kosovo to save civilians.  On the 
other hand, Hungary did not have a role in OUP consistent with its earlier policy of 
refusing to participate in Kosovo.  Hungary’s non-participation can be attributed to its 
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past diplomatic and trade relationships with Libya; however, even without actual 
involvement, Hungary offered public support for the intervention to protect civilians, but 
not for regime change.144   
The Czech Republic followed a variation of the same playbook from Kosovo, as it 
did not participate in the operation, but it did offer public support for the air strikes 
against Qaddafi.  This could be attributed to the public support for an intervention, but 
also the fact that the Czech Republic did not have the military assets to participate.145  
This comes back to this idea that Olson and Zeckhauser discussed about how smaller 
nations see themselves as incapable of impacting the situation in the alliance.  While the 
Czech public did not support participation in the air strikes, there was significant support 
for NATO’s intervention with close to 48 percent believing the strikes were warranted.146 
In the end, it seems that Czechs were in favor of the prevention of killing civilians, but 
for their country not to partake in the operation is indicative of the problem with burden-
sharing.   
Even though some countries support action, they are not willing to participate in 
the action themselves, leaving other countries to shoulder a greater portion of the burden.  
Additionally, it becomes harder when militarily superior allies like Turkey, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Poland do not offer support and Belgium, Denmark, and Norway – 
countries that had significantly smaller military assets – “provided a disproportionately 
high level of support.”147  Also of interest is the number of non-NATO countries that 
contributed assets to the air campaign.  This includes Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab 
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Emirates, and Sweden, which all contributed some form of military assistance.148  It 
seems that many of these “tier 3” countries were not willing to offer assistance to the 
operation, forcing other allies to shoulder more of the burden.   
Analysis: Tier 1 Leads Kosovo, Tier 2 Leads Libya 
The takeaways from the case studies support the hypothesis that the top two tiers 
(singling out Great Britain, France, and the United States) have the greatest impact in the 
conduct of NATO operations. OAF clearly showcased the significant role of the United 
States in the results of the operation.  While other tiers like 2 and 3 did offer contributions 
to the operation and flew a significant amount of sorties, Great Britain and France were 
not able to effectively conduct the operations without U.S. logistical support, which 
included intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, as well as a significant amount of 
refueling support for aircraft.  Great Britain may have pushed the most for airstrikes with 
its political advocacy, but the United States was instrumental to the overall success of the 
operation.  This falls under the free-rider problem because the United States was still 
called on to shoulder a significant burden to support the “tier 2” allies in their strike 
sorties.  Obviously, the disparity in capabilities factors in, but it does not change the fact 
that Great Britain and France still needed a significant U.S. contribution even when the 
United States wanted to scale back involvement.  To add to this free rider idea, it seems 
perplexing that Greece was adamantly against the intervention, but then decided to offer 
ground troops for KFOR.  In addition, it appears that some nations offered political 
support, but did not give enough in terms of military support  
In the end, OAF was a prime example of the burden-sharing problem in NATO.  
According to Daalder and O’Hanlon, “Operation Allied Force certainly revealed what 
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many already realized or suspected before: that European NATO members are not, on 
balance, contributing their share of the transatlantic security bargain.”149  Furthermore, 
German General Klaus Naumann, a top NATO military official, argued that this could be 
a harbinger for future NATO burden-sharing arguments, stating that,  
There is a totally unacceptable imbalance of military capabilities between the U.S. 
and its allies, notably the Europeans.  With no corrective action taken as a matter 
of urgency, there will be increasing difficulties to ensure interoperability of allied 
forces, and operational security could be compromised. Moreover, it cannot be 
tolerated that one ally has to carry on average some 70%, in some areas up to 
95%, of the burden.150  
 
However, in Libya, “tier 2” countries like Great Britain and France took the lead 
while the United States took a step back from the operation.  The interesting aspect of the 
overall Libya campaign was that the Europeans now had more capabilities to shoulder 
their fair share of the burden for NATO operations.  According to Anrig, the military gap 
between the European allies and the United States “ha[d] narrowed, not only in terms of 
equipment but also in terms of willingness to intervene.”151  Yet in the end, the allies 
needed military logistical support to carry out the airstrikes, utilizing U.S. capabilities.  
As the strongest power in the alliance, the United States can have a significant impact on 
the results of a campaign; however, they decided it was best to scale back involvement in 
this specific operation.  This could be a win for the burden-sharing argument that the 
United States complains about and the success of France and Great Britain’s involvement 
to lead the NATO campaign only adds to that argument.  Yet even when the United 
States scaled back its involvement, some in “tier 3” still refused to share the burden.  This 
may occur because they do not have the military capabilities to partake in certain 
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operations.  It seems that while “tier 2” did take on more of the burden, “tier 3’s” lack of 
involvement does not put to rest the burden-sharing issue.  This operation had a far 
smaller number of NATO members offering their political and military contributions 
with only six members carrying out the strike operations and more than half not 
participating in the campaign at all. It may be necessary in the future to push the smaller 
countries to offer more in support to operations and carry their burden so they can be 
upstanding members of the alliance.   
Looking at both operations through the prism of these tiers, I think that they are 
indicative of NATO’s problems with burden-sharing.  Both operations showed a small 
number of NATO members are shouldering the burden with the United States in Kosovo 
and Great Britain and France in Libya.  Libya may have shown the success of “tier 2” to 
conduct an operation without significant U.S. support, but it still showed the lack of 
determination by the rest of NATO to take on their fair share as well.  Regardless of the 
military success of the Libya operation and the fact that some smaller nations shared the 
burden of the operation, it does not quell the argument that many NATO members are 
free-riders in the alliance.   
Conclusion:  
This chapter shows the effect of NATO member tiers on the conduct of the 
alliance’s operations, using burden-sharing to determine each tier’s impact on the 
outcome of the operation.  In the end, OAF showed how American involvement (or “tier 
1”) significantly contributed to a swift operation and achieving the stated goals.  
Milosevic surrendered after three months of bombing raids and it could have taken longer 
without the United States.  OUP proved that “tier 2” could take on a greater burden and 
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achieve a successful mission, but the seven-month operation was a little longer without 
America’s involvement in conducting the actual airstrikes.  Could America’s 
involvement have impacted the outcome more positively? It is plausible to believe that 
assertion, but only history will judge as the operation gets further and further away and 
Libya continues to evolve following the end of Qaddafi’s rule.  In terms of NATO 
functioning without certain countries shouldering the burden or not, the operations 
achieved the intended outcomes: protecting civilians and ending the rules of dictators.   
Regardless of the successes, the current NATO model of certain tiers shoulder 
more of the burden than other members is not sustainable for the alliance in the future.  
There continues to be a problem with some nations contributing more political and 
materiel resources to operations than others. Tomas Valasek has an interesting 
perspective on this whole issue.  Even though countries may decide to stay out of an 
operation, “the alliance continues to do its work.”
152
  He adds that “since the end of the 
Cold War, NATO has been acting more like a shifting coalition of the willing than a true 
alliance.”
153
  In addition, Francois Heisbourg points out that “NATO has become a 
service provider, with different allies turning to it for different services.”
154
  These 
interpretations are indicative of NATO’s role in the 21
st
 century.  It has shifted from its 
role as a traditional alliance where every member contributes to the operation to an 
alliance where members pick and choose their commitments.   
So far, NATO has still been effective in carrying out its missions to preserve 
peace and security.  However, the future of NATO may depend on how certain “tier 3” 
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countries choose to contribute to NATO’s missions in this age of non-state threats.  In an 
ideal world, each NATO member should shoulder an equal burden for operations.  With 
global conflicts moving from state-based war to asymmetric fighting, NATO will need 
better methods for ensuring that every member contributes to its efforts.  Only time will 
tell if NATO can rise above the burden-sharing debate and actually function successfully 
to combat global security challenges.   
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Chapter 3: Non-State Threats and NATO Military Operations 
Once the Cold War ended, NATO’s main threat – Soviet aggression – 
disappeared and observers asked whether the alliance could survive in the post-Cold War 
world.  Yet, even without the Soviet threat, NATO still found a reason to have a role in 
global security matters, particularly with the emergence of non-state threats.  NATO 
found a way to provide stability and security even if it shifted slightly from its original 
design of a collective defense organization with its humanitarian interventions and 
conflict stabilization efforts. This process of adaptation allowed NATO to evolve from its 
original design as a collective defense organization concerned with the direct Soviet 
threat and state-on-state conflict to a collective security organization focused on rapid 
deployments in order to counter indirect non-state threats.   
In the new strategic environment post-Cold War, NATO has adapted and 
transformed to respond out-of-area to non-state threats, such as terrorism, insurgencies, 
ethnic cleansing, and state failures.  This chapter will answer the question of whether 
NATO’s adaptation to non-state threats in out-of-area conflicts was successful.  My 
hypothesis for this chapter is that NATO’s ability to adapt to changing security 
challenges outside of NATO’s regional borders allowed the alliance to conduct military 
operations against non-state threats, which resulted in stable and secure environments on 
the ground.  
This chapter begins by examining the nature of non-state threats and then 
NATO’s evolution from its original charter in order to survive.  The chapter looks at the 
concepts of NATO’s persistence through institutional theory in order to explain its 
adaptation.  The next section discusses the general concepts of NATO’s transformation 
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and adaptation after major events in global history.  This chapter then focuses on what 
NATO’s strategic concepts indicate about how it may have adapted to conduct successful 
post-Cold War military operations that featured non-state threats.  The chapter focuses on 
two case studies that involved non-state threats, such as ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, 
and terrorism to illustrate that NATO’s adaptation was successful, resulting in successful 
military operations.  Emphasizing these concepts and the alliance’s capacity to adapt to 
new threats will support the argument for NATO’s indispensable role in the 21
st
 century.   
The Nature of Non-States Threats and How to Fight Them 
 When defining non-state threats, one could immediately think of threats that did 
not feature a conventional military vs. military battle.  Some have specifically defined 
non-state threats to include terrorism, cyber warfare, and insurgencies.
1
  According to Lt. 
General Teodor Frunzeti, non-state threats “have been identified [as] new risks, dangers 
and threats of global scale and high intensity, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, organized crime, and other processes and phenomena which…can 
have a negative impact such as globalization that intensifies those listed above.”
2
  Elinor 
Sloan noted that irregular warfare is not conventional warfare between two countries with 
standing militaries, but would also involve a non-state actor.
3
  This type of threat might 
have seemed more prevalent now, but it has been around for quite some time and 
discussed in different ways, according to Lt. Colonel John Nagl (Ret.).
4
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Yet it is the 21
st
 century where these threats would dominate, because of other 
factors due to the end of the Cold War, such as globalization.
5
  Frunzeti’s studies 
emphasized the theory that the Cold War served as the catalyst for these threats to impact 
the strategic environment for NATO and the rest of the world and allowed for 
globalization to dominate the political environment.
6
  Because of the evolution of the 
threats that contribute to globalization, some observers have argued that conflict cannot 
be focused primarily on state-on-state conflicts, but more on asymmetric threats that arise 
throughout the world.
7
  Due to this “paradigm shift,” the unconventional threats that 
Frunzeti discussed in previous studies have a significant impact on international security.
8
  
While non-state threats may be more common in the 21
st
 century, it was not NATO’s 
original intent to deal with these types of threats because the alliance acted as a deterrent 
to Soviet aggression to defend the collective alliance of Western European nations 
against the Warsaw Pact and communism.  
NATO’s Institutional Survival  
According to Stephen Walt, “An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for 
security cooperation between two or more states.  Although the precise arrangements 
embodied in different alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a 
commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified 
set of circumstances.”
9
  In addition, NATO was created as a political alliance between 
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members where each had common interests and utilized NATO as a vehicle to achieve 
those interests.
10
  When formed, the allies hoped NATO would serve as a counterweight 
to the growing Soviet rise in Eastern Europe and “to defend beleaguered Western 
European nations against the threat of communism, either from within through national 
Communist parties, or from without through such military actions as the Soviet Union 
might mount against them,” which came with a large conventional military deployment – 
mainly by the United States – to defend against Soviet aggression.
11
  In essence, the 
NATO treaty was used as a vehicle to rebuild Western Europe into a community that 
shared the same political and economic values.
12
  In addition, NATO was used as a forum 
to help negotiate arms reduction treaties with the Communists and prevent nuclear 
confrontation, especially during the periods of détente.
13
  While it was not considered an 
organization at the time of its founding, the North Atlantic Treaty bound the parties 
together in the traditional sense of an alliance.  However, NATO evolved from a 
collection of allies guided by the treaty to a more structured global security organization 
that was guided by governing principles in order to conduct operations.
14
   
The end of the Cold War presented the first challenge to NATO’s survival.  Some 
observers believed NATO would lose its purpose without the Communist threat.  John 
Mearsheimer and other “realists” believed that following the end of the Cold War, 
international institutions like NATO would have “minimal influence on state behavior, 
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and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-cold War world,” meaning 
there was no role for it at all.
15
 However, others believed that given NATO’s structure 
and organization, it did have the capabilities to adapt to the changing strategic 
environment that came with the fall of the Soviet Union.  John Duffield and Robert 
McCalla have emphasized NATO’s “persistence,” while Celeste Wallander points out 
NATO’s “adaptability” following the end of the Cold War.
16
  In fact, Wallander argued 
that alliances can also be viewed as security institutions, which may explain why NATO 
was able to evolve the way that it did.
17
  Wallander stated that institutions like NATO 
“persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain, so they may remain 
useful despite changed circumstances.”
18
  Wallander’s argument seemed to add to what 
McCalla focused on when discussing various organizational theories to explore why 
NATO has survived past the Cold War.     
Robert McCalla focused a study on NATO’s persistence after the Cold War, 
which highlights this same issue.  McCalla argued that scholars have not studied in-depth 
why alliances have persisted when the threat has disappeared, mainly focusing on the 
realist and neorealist theories of why alliances are actually created.
19
  He uses three 
theories within the scope of alliance theory – neorealist, organizational, and institutional 
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– to highlight why NATO was successful in its survival.
20
  To define these theories, 
McCalla notes that neorealists believe that NATO would “falter absent its threat,” while 
he points out that organizational theory discusses that the interests of NATO itself drive 
its behavior to persist; whereas the institutional theory argues in favor of NATO’s 
persistence due the shared norms and values of the members.
21
 His arguments of NATO’s 
uses of organizational and institutional theories highlight components that seem to 
explain the persistence better than neorealist theory, which is more focused on NATO’s 
disappearance after a threat is gone.  While McCalla emphasized that organizations do 
not have uniform goals, he explained that there is willingness for the organization to 
modify and change its goals to survive regardless of what some members may believe is 
the best course of action for moving forward.
22
  NATO adapted to the strategic 
environment, but maintained its core values. This indicated that the alliance remained 
more concerned with its survival and took the actions to repurpose its role for the post-
Cold War world.
23
   
International institutional theory also provided good arguments for explaining 
NATO’s survival.  McCalla pointed out that institutions have a formal structure in place 
and because of this structure there are benefits to members that may go beyond the the 
institution’s original intent.
24
 In addition, with a formalized structure in place, members 
realize that it is better to maintain the institution and adapt it rather than creating a new 
one.
25
  McCalla argued that this theory best explains NATO’s persistence, because it 
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shows adapting to a new environment and using existing structures as a better way to 
maintain an institution, which has lasted for four decades rather than folding it and 
creating a new organization.
26
  It seems that using existing structures and repurposing the 
mechanisms of the alliance tends to be easier for adapting in the post-Cold War world.  
Taking this a step further, Wallander focused on NATO as an institution and argued that 
NATO began by developing general assets for action, but then evolved during the Cold 
War to use specific resources to counter the Soviet threat.
27
  However, by shedding the 
specific assets NATO became able to adapt to the changing security environment when 
the Soviet Union was no longer a threat.
28
  I think the arguments that McCalla and 
Wallander laid out have important relevance for showing NATO’s survival and serve as a 
guide for understanding why non-state threats may have led to this adaptation.  The end 
of the Soviet threat and the rise of unconventional and non-state threats pushed NATO to 
change its calculus.  However, with NATO’s mechanisms and assets already in place, it 
was able to recalibrate the alliance rather than ending it.  
General Concepts about NATO’s Ability to Adapt and Transform 
Much has been written about NATO’s transformation from its original design as a 
Cold War defensive security alliance. Several observers focus on issues of NATO’s 
transformation in a number of interconnected areas, such as new missions, new 
capabilities, and NATO enlargement, which all contributed to the Alliance’s core Article 
2 goal of friendly international relations and stability around the world.
29
  Scholars all 
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seem to agree that transformation happened, but they prove it in a number of different 
ways.  Ivan Dinev Ivanov examined these issues and further extrapolated them by using 
club goods theory and complementarities to show NATO’s transformation through three 
interrelated actions: enlargement, new missions, and new capabilities.
30
  Ivanov believed 
that the fusion of these actions best explained NATO’s transformation.  Kwang Ho Chun 
focused on enlargement, but looked at NATO’s adaptation by investigating the 
“institutions, capabilities, and political will” that transformed the alliance to its current 
form; however, he believed that enlargement caused internal conflict between members, 
which may have had ramifications for NATO’s ability to successful adapt.
31
  Those 
studies seemed to focus more on the expansion issue.   
Others like Andrew T. Wolff are more interested in the instabilities and friction 
that NATO’s transformation has caused within the alliance to redefine its role in the 
world, since there does not seem to be a clear definition of what NATO’s role should 
be.
32
  He talked about security reforms and highlighted particular actions through the 
guise of how these actions have hurt cooperation between the alliance.
33
 Wolff offered 
some relevant points to this study, specifically that NATO’s transformation was defined 
by expanding the meaning of security for the post-Cold War world. Wolff indicated that 
this new security meant the alliance needed to be more agile in responding to threats, 
promoting democracy, and collective defense.
34
  This is a good point that shows the need 
to respond to new challenges, particularly unconventional threats that so far define the 
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 century.  Gareth Winrow offered a similar argument that the transformation occurred 
because NATO understood the need to shift from the collective defensive nature of the 
alliance towards projecting stability and managing crises to have an impact.
35
  This 
uncertain and complex world may have caused transformation and adaptability.
36
  While 
scholars examined the concept of transformation differently most seemed to agree on the 
existence of adaptation and transformation.  Winrow and Wolff both highlight the 
shifting nature of the challenges NATO would face in the Cold War world, which 
supports the argument about how non-state threats caused NATO to adapt.  In addition, 
they seemed to imply that these challenges would be indirect in nature and would focus 
more on threats that did not fall within the realm of traditional state-on-state Cold war 
conflict.   
It appears that adaptability and transformation are similar concepts when it comes 
to NATO’s post-Cold War functions because they both highlight the need for NATO to 
change with the times in order to survive.  Wolff offers a definition of what 
transformation is for NATO; specifically that it is a wide-ranging term to describe all of 
NATO’s changes post-Cold War to keep the alliance relevant.
37
 Adaptability can also be 
defined in the same way as transformation, because as McCalla showed, adaptability kept 
several NATO mechanisms and structures in place to survive after the Soviet threat.  It 
seemed that transformation and adaptability occurred in order for NATO to stay relevant 
following the end of the Cold War.  Without finding a way to survive, NATO would have 
just disappeared once the Soviet Union fell.  These are the general concepts for 
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understanding NATO’s evolution, but they do not really discuss non-state threats and 
why these threats may have caused this change in NATO’s strategic worldview.   
Out-of-Area Operations and Strategic Concepts 
The previous section focused on the general concept of transformation/adaptation 
in NATO.  One of the main examples of this concept was NATO’s focus towards out-of-
area operations.   Following the end of the Cold War, Senator Richard Lugar famously 
said that for NATO to have a role in the new world it would need to “go out-of-area or 
out-of-business.”
38
  Lugar adequately describes the next period in NATO’s history, since 
out-of-area operations would become the new normal for NATO in the 21
st
 century.  
NATO’s shift away from Cold War defense to focus on out-of-area operations meant that 
the alliance moved away from nuclear deterrence and massing troops on the border of the 
Warsaw Pact countries, which were commonplace during the Cold War.  Out-of-area 
operations would consist of smaller and rapidly deployed forces that could conduct 
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement operations, which 
demonstrated to be the most effective way to combat the different conflicts.
39
  In essence, 
these operations would concentrate on “military, political social, economic, etc. 
developments in territory which is out-of-area” because these conflicts would offer new 
risks and challenges for NATO to deal with.
40
  More than anything, out-of-area 
operations also would provide NATO with an ability to stay relevant in the post-Cold 
War world.  Veronica Kitchen stated that NATO understood the necessity to become 
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involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping, since it recognized the responsibility to 
shape stability in the regions with proximity to the allies.
41
  NATO viewed the common 
interest for participating in these out-of-area operations to prevent genocide and to ensure 
global stability.
42
  If anything was apparent from the out-of-area focus, it was that NATO 
moved from collective defense against a common enemy to collective security in order to 
ensure a stable international order post-Cold War.   
NATO adapted and moved towards out-of-area conflicts through the definition of 
its overall strategy, otherwise known as the drafting and release of three “strategic 
concepts.”  Andreas Behnke offered a useful definition of a strategic concept, which 
“defines the political and military purpose of NATO, thereby providing a ‘world picture’ 
containing a spatialization of the Alliance’s security political environment, designations 
of agency, and an enumeration of available and legitimate means and strategies through 
which to mediate the re-presented entities.”
43
 Before the end of the Cold War, NATO’s 
strategic concepts were kept classified from the public, but following 1991 NATO saw a 
need to make its strategy public.
44
  The 1991 Strategic Concept may offer more 
understanding for NATO’s changing calculus, mainly because it was the first concept 
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that discussed the need for NATO to look at threats outside of former conventional 
military engagements with communist powers.
45
 
While the 1991 Strategic Concept argued that collective defense remained a core 
principle of the alliance, the document mentioned indirect threats to NATO that came 
from instabilities caused by economic, social, and political tensions.
46
  Specific passages 
focus on the security risks and challenges to NATO in 1991.  In the following passage, 
NATO specifically argued that the environment changed with the end of the Soviet 
Union, but other threats emerged to challenge NATO.    
The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from 
what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of 
NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer 
provides the focus for Allied strategy…Two conclusions can be drawn from this 
analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not 
change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines 
their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed 
environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within 




These threats identified in the strategic concept were viewed outside the realm of 
traditional state-on-state conflicts between the Soviet aggressors and the Western allies.  
With the end of the Cold War, NATO immediately saw the need to adapt to the new 
strategic environment. This passage explicitly states that NATO was not concerned with 
direct threats from Soviet aggressors anymore, but foresaw a different type of threat that 
might impact stability. By recognizing this threat to stability, NATO noticed an 
opportunity to use its existing mechanisms and adapt them to the changing environment 
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to have a broader role in the global security context.  The fundamental tasks of NATO 
laid out in the strategic concept add to the idea that NATO viewed the environment 
differently and was ready to adapt. However, this particular strategic concept did not 
specifically highlight out-of-area operations for NATO to survive. The focus for NATO 
would be more on rebuilding Eastern Europe following the fall of the Warsaw Pact and 
ensuring Western European security by pushing for stability in those countries. It appears 
that the out-of-area focus for NATO would happen towards the end of the decade.  The 
first strategic concept offered a useful guide for NATO’s posture in the post-Cold War 
world, but as evidenced by later strategic concepts in the decade, the constantly changing 
environment would cause NATO to recalibrate its efforts when new threats emerged, 
which would require out-of-area operations.   
The 1999 Strategic Concept seemed to focus on the same issues, but the conflict 
in the Balkans would cause NATO to realize that out-of-area operations offered greater 
opportunities for its survival.  The 1999 Strategic Concept indicated that alliance security 
would still need to look at indirect, non-state threats that were “multi-dimensional and 
often difficult to predict,” which could potentially cause instability and uncertainty.
48
  
The 1999 Strategic Concept highlights the same ideas of non-military risks that could be 
multi-dimensional and hard to predict, but it also highlighted the rise of ethnic conflicts 
and territorial disputes that have created instability in non-NATO countries and could 
affect security of NATO members.
49
 The most important component of this passage was 
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the mention of these conflicts and threats occurring on the “periphery” of NATO.
50
 This 
appeared to be the first mention of NATO’s understanding of non-state threats and that 
they could occur in the out-of-area regions, which would require responses outside the 
realm of Cold War defense.
51
  According to the strategic concept, this would require 
partnerships across NATO and other non-NATO countries, as well as focusing on crisis 
management.  Crisis management seemed to define the nature of the threats NATO 
would face and the out-of-area operations it would need to utilize:    
Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in 
conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective 





Behnke argued that a lack of clarity existed regarding the particular direct threats NATO 
would face.  Since the location of the threats remained unknown, the alliance looked 
more generally at the shifting strategic environment.
53
  Again, it appeared that these were 
indirect threats that NATO viewed around the world and that a response would be 
necessary to survive the post-Cold War world.  Perhaps this vague mention of the direct 
threats and the lack of specificity was a helpful example of NATO’s organizational 
adaptation.  It is plausible to believe that by using this vague interpretation, NATO was 
finding a means to survive by preparing itself for any emerging threat and be ready to 
adapt as needed.   
The 2010 Strategic Concept provided an example of why NATO placed high 
importance on a non-state threat like terrorism.  NATO was eager to draft a new strategic 
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concept, which seemed different from the past two, because its leaders understood that it 
needed to be more capable and effective to deal with the different challenges it faced.
54
  
The 2010 Strategic Concept specifically showed the wide variety of threats to NATO 
members that focused on the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMDs, terrorism, and 




  It recognized 
other non-state threats, but it is important to note that this was the first time that terrorism 
was mentioned in a NATO strategic concept as a specific “direct threat” to the alliance. 
In fact, it appeared that this was the first time that a direct threat was mentioned since the 
Cold War. The 2010 Strategic Concept stated that,  
Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, 
and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.  Extremist groups 
continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and 
modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in 





More importantly, the strategic concept showed two components of NATO’s strategy 
going forward in the 21
st
 century to add to collective defense: crisis management and 
cooperative security.
57
  These components guided how NATO would respond to security 
and stability concerns going forward.  Some have argued that the 2010 Strategic Concept 
defined how NATO should respond to security issues outside of Europe.
58
  There was 
another passage in the strategic concept that may explain NATO’s reasoning for focusing 
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more on non-state threats, according to Alessandro Marrone.  The passage argued that, 
“instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security.”
59
  
While the purpose of this concept was to determine NATO’s role in the new century 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, it may have created a NATO that would 
be a hybrid.  This meant that while NATO wanted to be involved in security issues 
completely outside of its sphere of responsibility so that it could survive, the direct threat 
of terrorism also gave the alliance a new component to its mission and another reason to 
adapt.   
To briefly summarize the findings in the strategic concepts, the 1991 and 1999 
Strategic Concepts show the changing nature of the threats and NATO’s role in 
promoting stability, as well as out-of-area operations.  However, the out-of-area and 
stability components do not seem to focus on direct threats to the alliance, but more on 
indirect threats such as ethnic conflicts and instability on NATO’s periphery.  More than 
anything, the strategic concepts show that NATO identified a variety of new threats and 
sought to find ways to counter them to ensure its survival.   
Methodology and Hypothesis 
The literature review discussed several concepts, particularly where NATO’s 
adaptation came from and how the strategic concepts guided the strategy for NATO in 
the post-Cold War world.  In addition, the strategic concepts and the corresponding 
literature highlighted NATO’s adaptation to indirect, non-state threats following the end 
of the Cold War and that NATO found a role for itself in this new strategic environment 
through adapting past mechanisms to survive and stay relevant.  The existing literature 
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may have explained NATO’s adaptation to the non-state threats it faced; however, it did 
not specifically highlight whether this adaptation helped the alliance conduct military 
operations against these threats in specific conflicts.  
Given the discussion about NATO’s ability to adapt to the changing strategic 
environment and establishing mechanisms to conduct operations against non-state threats, 
it seems plausible that the adaptation would allow NATO to successfully conduct military 
operations in environments different from the Cold War.  I use the two specific conflicts 
of Bosnia and Afghanistan as cases to argue that NATO’s evolution to non-state threats 
in these environments produced successful military operations.  I chose Bosnia for the 
purposes of exploring the first operation that NATO participated in following the end of 
the Cold War.  I also chose it because it fell into the non-state threat category due to the 
ethnic conflict that was being perpetrated by non-state actors, as well as displacement and 
genocide.  I chose the Afghanistan case because it was the first conflict where NATO had 
to respond to non-state threats like terrorism, insurgencies, and post-conflict 
reconstruction.    
Given the findings of the literature review regarding NATO’s willingness to adapt 
and survive, I expect that the alliance’s adaptation towards non-state threats allows 
NATO to conduct military operations against non-state threats in these two different 
campaigns and deliver successful results that ensure stability and security.  To support 
my claim that NATO’s concept of adaptation to non-state threats produced military 
operations that created stability and security in these conflicts, this chapter will use 
process tracing to examine the various NATO military actions in Bosnia and 
Afghanistan.    
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Case Study: NATO’s First-Ever Ground Deployment in Bosnia 
The ethnic conflict in Bosnia represented NATO’s first ever deployment of 
ground forces to stabilize a conflict outside its regional area of responsibility: Western 
Europe.
60
  In addition, the Bosnia conflict appeared to be the first moment when NATO’s 
transformation came into play.  This was the first instance where NATO’s common-held 
belief of territorial defense was not applied to the outcome of a conflict that NATO was 
involved in because it occurred outside Western Europe.
61
  Also, this was the first 
unconventional war that NATO would participate in following the end of the Cold War, 
outside the normal operations that NATO was accustomed to.
62
   
In the conflict, NATO employed airpower to turn back aggressors and eventually 
established a peacekeeping mission to maintain stability.  More importantly, conducting 
out-of-area missions became necessary for the alliance’s survival, resulting in NATO 
moving away from its Western European focus to respond to the violence in Bosnia.
63
  It 
is worth noting that observers have commented on the lack of literature about the Bosnia 
peacekeeping mission following the Dayton Accords, which served as the bulk of 
NATO’s involvement.
64
  I use the existing literature to explain the conflict and show the 
conduct of the operations.  The case study examines NATO’s role in the Bosnia conflict 
and discerns if NATO’s adaptation to this non-state threat allows the alliance to conduct 
effective military operations that achieve successful results.   
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NATO’s Use of Conventional Airpower 
A number of factors prompted NATO involvement to stop genocide in Bosnia. In 
fact, the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
As the 1991 Strategic Concept stated, NATO would be faced with indirect threats to its 
borders following the fall of communism and the Bosnia conflict applied to this 
challenge.  At first, while the threats may have been confined to the region, the inability 
of the United Nations (UN) and other entities to address the violence prompted NATO’s 
eventual involvement.
65
  Collectively, NATO could have more of an impact than the UN, 
mainly because of its structure and military capabilities.  Furthermore, the political 
factors contributed to NATO’s involvement in Bosnia.  NATO members believed that 
their democratic values and model for ensuring regional stability could not be confined to 
just the member states.
66
  This also meant, as Behnke noted, a resurgence of violence in 
the European continent could jeopardize the “resurgence of democracy” and stability in 
the region and could cause the region to relive the horrors of the Cold War.
67
  
NATO had minimal involvement in the Bosnian conflict before 1995.  The 
alliance assisted the United Nations with establishing command and control centers for 
the UN Protection Force, enforcing a no-fly zone (Operation Deny Flight), maritime 
security (Operation Sharp Guard), and contingency planning if the conflict would spill 
into Western European borders.
68
  Interestingly, many believed that only NATO could 
pull together the necessary resources to stop the ethnic cleansing and violence.
69
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NATO’s “aggressive” air operations began after the horrific massacre in Srebrenica in 
1995.
70
  Operation Deliberate Force began soon thereafter, which included 3,400 
bombing sorties against Bosnian Serb positions, which had the goal of forcing an end to 
attacks on innocents and ethnic cleansing.
71
  The operations also included the policing of 
a no-fly zone and intercepting unauthorized enemy aircraft.
72
  Some argued that the 
operations to enforce a no-fly zone actually achieved political goals by easing the 
pressure on Sarajevo, preventing the fall of Gorazde, and giving the foundation for the 
Dayton Peace Accords.
73
  The Dayton Peace Accords resulted in NATO’s involvement as 
the primary actor in an international peacekeeping force to maintain stability and prevent 
future hostilities.
74
  Airpower may have served to end the violence between the warring 
parties, but NATO’s subsequent peacekeeping mission would test its ability to deliver 
military operations to ensure stability.  
NATO and Peacekeeping in Bosnia 
Following hostilities, NATO began Operation Joint Endeavor that sought to 
implement the Dayton Peace Accords.  NATO participated in the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) to ensure that the warring parties withdrew their militaries and complied with 
ceasefires.
75
  The UN gave the mandate for these forces to ensure compliance with the 
Dayton Peace Accords.
76
  In addition to providing stability on the ground and ensuring 
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the continued cessation of hostilities, IFOR also had the task of creating boundaries 
between the warring participants and the return of the political process to the region.
77
  
IFOR consisted of 60,000 troops from NATO and non-NATO countries and was far more 
effective in peacekeeping than the UN Force previously tasked with “humanitarian aid 
and safe-haven mandates” earlier in the conflict.
78
  
IFOR’s mandate was only supposed to last a year, but the international 
community and the alliance recognized a need for an ongoing presence in the region to 
assist the countries with ongoing implementation of the Dayton Accords.  The extension 
occurred to ensure further reconstruction and stability, as well as securing conditions for 
peace to allow for an eventual end to NATO’s military presence.
79
 Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) was created following this decision with a broader mandate to focus on 
economic development, reconstruction, and political development.
80
  SFOR’s role would 
evolve over time to support activities of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), 
international policing efforts, security sector assistance, and providing a “secure 
environment for internal development.”
81
  In addition, NATO’s participation in the 
Bosnian peacekeeping missions focused on ground security and regulation of the borders 
to ensure a cessation of future violence and ethnic cleansing.
82
  Moreover, SFOR’s 
mandate extended beyond peacekeeping, since it was responsible – along with a 
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significant NATO role – to provide security for elections and to ensure that Bosnia and 
its neighbors handled security matters on their own.
83
   
The NATO intervention in Bosnia resulted in a stronger sense of citizen security, 
because IFOR and SFOR stabilized the situation on the ground and held the warring 
parties to task.
84
  Yet NATO’s response to Bosnia did not come without criticism, which 
focused on NATO cautiousness in several of its peacekeeping responsibilities, including 
protecting refugees, going after suspected war criminals, and managing community 
policing.
85
  However, even with the criticisms, NATO provided stability through its 
military operations in Bosnia.  NATO improved its operations and nearly 723,000 
refugees returned, oversaw open elections, captured and indicted 21 war criminals, and 
successfully removed 120,000 mines and 11,000 small arms.
86
  Admiral Leighton Smith, 
the IFOR commander at the time, acknowledged that IFOR “successfully met the military 
provisions of the Dayton Accords because of its robust force, its rules of engagement, and 
its resolve to use force when necessary.”
87
 The stability mission’s success still produced 
significant results with the return of refugees, apprehension of war criminals, and a 
reduction in violence.  This allowed NATO to conclude the mission in 2004, as well as 
and move towards consultations on defense reforms and continued coordination with the 
country to detain war criminals.
88
   
                                                 
83
 McMahon, “Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?” 573. 
84
 Ibid., 578 
85
 Webber, “NATO’s Post-Cold War Operations in Europe,” 63. Also, see McMahon, “Rebuilding Bosnia: 
A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?” 578.  
86
 Lansford, All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States, 48. 
87
 Leighton W. Smith, NATO's IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999), 1. 
88
 “NATO ends SFOR mission,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 2, 2004, Accessed October 
5, 2014 http://www.nato.int/DOCU/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm  
101 
 
According to some observers, the operations sufficiently showed NATO’s ability 
to adapt and deliver military operations against non-state threats, particularly because it 
could participate in an out-of-area operation and coordinate across the membership to 
provide stability on the ground.
89
 According to Mark Webber, the involvement carried 
more significance, because it served “as a catalyst for alterations to NATO doctrine and 
force structures during the latter 1990s, established important precedents for development 
of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities and, during the 2000s, NATO-EU 
relations.”
90
  Also, Ellen Hallams argued that NATO’s success in Bosnia reflected the 
fact that NATO’s institutional capacity allowed it to successfully to adapt to the new 
strategic environment and this provided advantages over a “looser coalition” of allies 
involved.
91
  NATO’s actions in Bosnia indicated that it understood the shifting nature of 
the security threats it would encounter in the last decade of the 20
th
 century.  The safe 
return of refugees, apprehension of war criminals, and ensuring greater stability support 
the argument that NATO’s adaptation to these new non-state challenges and threats 
created stability and security on the ground.   
Case Study: Combating New Threats in Afghanistan 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 represented the first time NATO ever invoked 
of Article V to respond to an attack on a member nation.  However, this invocation was 
different than the original intent of the alliance because it targeted non-state actors, Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, who perpetrated and supported the attacks on the United States.  
In addition to the first ever invocation of Article V, the mission in Afghanistan showed 
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NATO’s adaptation tested because it sought to conduct new military operations that 
focused on asymmetric warfare.  Some of the responses included reconstruction and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) – new concepts that NATO had not encountered in the past.  
Being able to effectively conduct these strategies in subsequent operations would be 
difficult for an alliance that had only previously utilized airpower and peacekeeping in 
Bosnia and Kosovo prior to the Afghanistan campaign.   
Invoking Article V and Operation Enduring Freedom 
With its invocation of Article V, NATO obviously had an interest in supporting 
the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.  However, in the earlier chapter on U.S. strategic 
interests, it was demonstrated that the United States initially prevented a NATO role in its 
response operations to the attacks.  This meant that in Afghanistan the United States 
would unilaterally conduct operations to destroy the safe haven where Al Qaeda launched 
its attacks on New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania.  Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) was strictly an American operation, but NATO would eventually take a 
role in Afghanistan during the stabilization and reconstruction efforts, as well as ongoing 
counterterror and COIN operations to destroy terrorists in Afghanistan and remove the 
Taliban from power.
92
   
NATO’s involvement started out gradually, particularly with intelligence 
cooperation and protection of allied facilities within its borders to prevent further attacks 
on Americans, among other actions.
93
  There was also the deployment of NATO aircraft 
to protect American borders from further attacks on U.S. soil, but these actions were 
more counterterrorism and homeland security-focused operations that did not involve 
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actual deployments in Afghanistan.
94
  NATO’s contributions to OEF were fairly minor 
compared to burden that the United States chose to shoulder. However, as explained in 
chapter 1, the United States sought to avoid using NATO for the operations in 
Afghanistan because, the fear of wasting time on consensus-building to get NATO 
members involved.  The United States wanted to pursue a rapid victory and its leaders 
believed that NATO involvement would hinder that objective.  Nevertheless, the United 
States eventually found a considerable need for NATO – its role in the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after delegating minor missions to the alliance and its 
members.  
NATO and ISAF: Initial Operations 
The ISAF mission was defined as a stability and reconstruction mission, which 
incorporated three main security tasks: “the aversion of a humanitarian crisis, the 
establishment and support of a legitimate government, and the presence of domestic 
security forces to support this government,” according to Ivanov.
95
  ISAF’s role under 
NATO’s command eventually evolved to focus on “disrupt[ing] the insurgency, 
deny[ing] the Taliban the ability to unseat the government and train Afghan security 
forces to eventually take over this role.”
96
 In essence, “ISAF was designed to facilitate 
nation building in a country that met all the conditions of a failed state,” according to 
Richard Rupp.
97
  Dealing with a failed state was an unfamiliar task for NATO and 
something it had not responded to in the past.  In Bosnia, state structures were in place 
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and the mission focused on providing stability to the existing state and keeping the peace 
between the warring parties.  The mission in Afghanistan would focus on reconstructing a 
state from scratch requiring numerous moving parts.   
When NATO took over command of ISAF in 2003, their operations primarily 
focused on securing the capital of Kabul and the immediate surrounding areas.
98
  In 
addition, the actions consisted of maintaining Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
which “were designed to serve as a vehicle to provide regional security while building 
ties with the civilian population.”
99
  This represented another operation that NATO did 
not have a previous background in and it received some criticism for not delivering 
effective PRTs.  According to Rupp, the United States voiced criticism of NATO’s role 
in specific PRTs.
100
  Additionally, Rupp explained that the NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander at the time criticized several NATO members for not adequately providing 
resources for the missions that ISAF needed to undertake in Afghanistan.
101
  The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) added that between 2001 and 2006, these same 
issues arose mainly because of the restrictions that several NATO members placed on 
their forces for operations and involvement with the PRTs.
102
  CRS argued that “caveats” 
placed on operations by the NATO allies in the early years of ISAF caused major 
problems for NATO’s effectiveness.
103
   
The restrictions placed on operations by NATO members indicate that the 
organizational principles that allowed NATO to be more flexible in its response to non-
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state threats may have had a detrimental impact on ISAF operations in Afghanistan.  
However, NATO’s inability to conduct these operations stemmed from the specific 
member, particularly with PRTs.  In essence, PRTs operated “without an overarching 
concept of operations, [did] not provide a common range of services, [did] not have a 
unified chain of command, and often [did] not coordinate with each other or exchange 
information on best practices.”
104
  This could be viewed as a failure of NATO’s 
adaptation to the nature of the mission and deliver effective military operations, which 
did not appear to change as NATO sought to implement a COIN strategy.   
ISAF Moves to a COIN Strategy 
As the situation deteriorated due to the emerging insurgency, NATO began 
implementing COIN to tamp down the violence and create an environment of stability.  
The success of COIN in Iraq may have influenced COIN’s use in Afghanistan.
105
  NATO 
began to implement a COIN strategy when it became evident that the Taliban achieved 
gains in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces.
106
  In addition to the rise of the Taliban, a 
considerable absence of security existed in southern Afghanistan, which caused more 
problems for ISAF.
107
  During 2006-2008, ISAF started to deploy its forces to southern 
Afghanistan to conduct reconstruction efforts and build the government in the region, but 
it lacked the tools to deal with the ongoing insurgency in that region.
108
 According to 
John Nagl and Richard Weitz, the ISAF troops in the region lacked the proper training in 
                                                 
104
 Ibid., 500 
105
 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2012), 204.  
106
 John Nagl and Richard Weitz, “Counterinsurgency and the Future of NATO,” The Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, October 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Trans-
Atlantic%20Papers%201-Nagl%20Weitz_v4.pdf, 7.  
107
 Ibid.  
108
 Ibid., 8 
106 
 
COIN and ineffectively delivered security to the region.
109
  It appeared that NATO’s 
problems for implementing a COIN strategy stemmed from not having the necessary 
assets and resources to conduct COIN-centric operations.
110
  However, in 2009, when the 
United States recalibrated its strategy in Afghanistan under the command of General 
Stanley McChrystal, support for a COIN strategy emerged as a method to stop the 
Taliban insurgency.
111
  However, it seemed that the strategy may not have been effective 
for ISAF due to the time limits placed on the troop increase for the COIN campaign by 
President Obama.
112
   
However, while the limits placed on campaign impacted NATO’s ability to 
conduct the COIN campaign, Sean Kay and Sahar Khan argued that because of NATO’s 
institutional design it could never really be equipped to run a COIN campaign.
113
  Kay 
and Khan commended NATO’s adaptation to the post-Cold War environment, but the 
alliance did not possess the “tactical assets needed for counter-insurgency.”
114
  According 
to Benjamin Schreer, NATO lacked the experience needed to prepare for 
counterinsurgency operations in the past, mainly because the last few NATO operations 
focused on peacekeeping.
115
  It appeared, according to Jens Ringsmose and Peter Dahl 
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Thruelsen that the limited mandate for NATO’s ISAF in Kabul caused the rest of the 
forces to lack the necessary resources to respond to terrorists throughout the country.
116
  
NATO eventually expanded to other parts of Afghanistan, but it exhibited a 
“reluctance to commit the necessary materiel and human resources” to conduct a 
successful campaign against the Taliban and other Afghan terrorists.
117
 NATO 
encountered challenges of “making available the sufficient resources and coordinating 
military and non-military activities.”
118
  Another key test for the alliance to provide a 
successful COIN operation was its inability to coordinate among the allies that were 
active in ISAF.  Ringsmose and Thruelsen argued that there was no strategic leadership 
in place in order to implement a unified COIN effort and since “unity of effort” was a 
tenet of COIN, this made it more difficult for NATO to be successful in its COIN 
operations.
119
  The criticisms appear more evident than the praises for NATO’s 
adaptation to a COIN strategy to ensure stability on the ground.  The strategies in 
Afghanistan were not successful, but it’s possible this was caused by NATO’s inability to 
use some of its new mechanisms.   
One interesting omission was the utilization of a new mechanism created by 
NATO to quickly respond to unconventional threats.  The NATO Response Force (NRF), 
NATO’s rapidly deployable force of 20,000 troops, was created to respond to terrorist 
attacks and other security challenges requiring a quick deployment.
120
  NRF’s omission 
                                                 
116
 Jens Ringsmose and Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “NATO's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Afghanistan: Are 
Classical Doctrines Suitable for Alliances,” UNISCI Discussion Papers 22 (2010), 62.  
117
 Ibid.  
118
 Ibid., 63.  
119
 Ibid., 64. 
120
 Ivanov, Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities, 123; Dzambic, “NATO’s 
Strategic Concept: Non-Traditional Threats and Bridging Military Capability Gaps,” 21; Luca Bonsignore, 
“NRF: Key Element of NATO Transformation: The NATO Response Force (NRF),” NATO’s Nations & 
Partners for Peace 50, no.2 (02, 2005), 44-49.  
108 
 
from the fight stems from NATO members who were totally opposed to using the NRF in 
Afghanistan.
121
  However, it may not have mattered if the allies were open to the idea.  
Schreer argued that the NRF concept could not work for COIN because it “ties up assets 
that would be useful in a [COIN] strategy.”
122
  It appears that even with assets created to 
respond to these specific threats, COIN was doomed from the start as the alliance did not 
have the institutional capacity to conduct an effective campaign.   
While NATO was willing to adapt to the non-state threats of terrorism and 
insurgencies, it did not have the capacity or design to deliver stability and security 
through COIN operations.  Even more revealing, observers believed this was inevitable 
because of NATO’s very nature as an integrated security organization.  Ringsmose and 
Thruelsen pointed out that “progress toward a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy 
has above all been stalled by NATO being what it is: an institutionalized cooperation 
between sovereign states.”
123
  In addition to NATO’s COIN inadequacies that may have 
been caused by NATO’s design to exhibit consensus for collective defense, there may not 
have been the political will for the members to participate in a prolonged campaign, 
according to Noetzel and Schreer.
124
 The ineffectiveness of NATO’s Afghanistan 
operations appeared to be an indication that the alliance was not ready to implement 
strategies like COIN, which were geared towards non-state threats.     
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Analysis: Success in Bosnia, but not in Afghanistan 
The case study results show two different outcomes on whether NATO’s 
adaptation allowed for the alliance to deliver successful military operations against non-
state threats.  Bosnia provided an example of successful military operations as seen from 
the results, as well as the withdrawal of SFOR in 2004.   Some argued that originally the 
Bosnia conflict actually presented a crisis for NATO, because it forced the alliance to 
debate long-held beliefs about its role in Article 5 missions and whether a role existed in 
the emerging security challenges facing the alliance.
125
  In the end, while NATO received 
criticisms for its overall mission in Bosnia, it seemed that the participation and 
management of IFOR and SFOR were effective and allowed for greater stability and 
security.   
One could argue that this adaptation may have been successful, since NATO had 
the institutional capacity to conduct military operations that were not as complicated and 
received greater support from members.  As Hallams argued earlier, NATO achieved 
success because it was more structured than a “looser coalition” of allies.
126
  In addition, 
while NATO may have received criticisms about how it conducted its operations early on 
in the IFOR/SFOR missions, these criticisms served as a catalyst for NATO’s adaptation 
to the changing nature of the missions.  Eventually, NATO conducted a successful 
military operation that produced successful results in helping Bosnia rebuild and feel 
more secure following the wars of the 1990s.  If the Bosnia operations helped NATO in 
anyway going forward, it was the confidence booster that the alliance received from the 
operations and the eventual establishment of new structures and guidelines for 
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cooperation between civilians and the military, particularly on conflict stabilization 
missions.
127
   
In Afghanistan, NATO’s adaptation to the non-state threats failed to achieve 
significant stability in Afghanistan.  This resulted from the alliance’s inability to rebuild 
Afghanistan and to deliver a COIN strategy to project stability and security in the 
country.  Given that NATO’s adaptation allowed for stability and security in Bosnia, the 
outcome in Afghanistan surprised me, especially given NATO’s willingness and actions 
to adapt and survive in the post-Cold War world.  However, the inability to deliver 
successful stability and security may have occurred because NATO did not understand 
the necessary response to these particular threats, according to scholars in the earlier case 
study.
128
  It seemed that COIN could not work in Afghanistan because of NATO’s 
structures as a security organization.  This might be related to the problems that the 
United States foresaw with NATO’s consensus building process when it decided to 
initially avoid using NATO in Afghanistan, as highlighted in chapter 1.   
Yet, it appeared that if NATO used past tactics in Afghanistan, a potentially 
different outcome may have occurred.  Kay and Khan argued that the Bosnian model 
would have been more successful in Afghanistan, because it offered lessons on a “speedy 
and sizeable deployment of forces, a clear mission, and contributions to a secure 
environment that allowed other institutions to engage in long-term nation-building.”
129
  I 
think that the Bosnian model may have been more instructive for the alliance in 
Afghanistan to respond to these non-state threats and not utilizing that model seems to 
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have cost the alliance in its effectiveness.  As Ringsmose and Thruelsen stated, COIN 
may not necessarily work for an organization like NATO due to the tenet of unity of 
effort, which can be more successful for a single member.  Afghanistan could have been 
an anomaly for the alliance, because it involved a different non-state threat from what the 
alliance dealt with in out-of-area conflicts, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and eventually Libya.  
However, as threats evolve to focus more on insurgencies and terrorism, Afghanistan 
draws lessons for the alliance to recalibrate its adaptation to be more effective in future 
operations to ensure stability and security against non-state threats.   
Conclusion:  
While the results were mixed, the research demonstrates that NATO’s adaptation 
can have moderate success in the post-Cold War world, particularly with regards to 
Bosnia.  However, Afghanistan was an example where the adaptation failed because 
NATO overreached with a COIN strategy.  Bosnia exhibits successful military operations 
due to NATO’s adaptation towards specific non-state threats in out-of-area conflicts.  
With the withdrawal of SFOR in 2004, it seemed that NATO accomplished its goals by 
creating a sense of security and stability in the country.  However, NATO’s failure in 
Afghanistan offers caution for future NATO exercises in adapting to non-state threats.  
The inability to implement a successful strategy may have contributed to this failure, but 
NATO’s actions in other conflicts show that the alliance can be an effective global 
security actor in the 21
st
 century.   
These conflicts offer instructive lessons for the new threats that NATO will be 
facing in the next decade.  The information from these case studies can spark discussion 
on how to conduct future NATO military operations successfully against non-state, out-
112 
 
of-area threats. The next decade seems to show that there will be a mix of threats for 
NATO to deal with, including non-state and state-on-state.  Already NATO will need to 
respond to the current non-state threats, such as from a revitalized Al Qaeda, as well as 
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  However, the Ukraine situation shows 
the essence of NATO’s original mandate may be needed to respond to aggression from a 
state actor threatening geopolitical stability.  If anything can be deduced from this 
chapter, NATO will continue to have a significant role to play in 21
st
 century security and 





This thesis sought to understand how NATO could be a relevant and effective 
post-Cold War alliance through the conduct of its military operations in various conflicts.  
Given the arguments in the previous three chapters, NATO’s military operations can still 
play a role to ensure global stability and security allowing NATO to be an effective post-
Cold War alliance.  The case studies throughout the three chapters support this claim in 
favor of NATO’s effectiveness in the post-Cold War world to preserve security, with the 
exception of the Afghanistan case study in the third chapter.  While NATO’s purpose 
shifted from its original intent as a Cold War collective defense alliance, the organization 
seemed to have effectively used military operations to project security and stability in 
conflicts that differed greatly from what the alliance faced against the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact.   
The first chapter of this thesis showed that even with the dominant role of the 
United States and its strategic interests, other member states and the organization itself 
voiced whether to conduct military operations, utilizing consensus-building mechanisms.  
NATO may have caused some of the issues that forced the United States to initially 
conduct unilateral operations in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the sluggish pace of 
consensus-building, but the fact that the United States needed the alliance in some 
capacity to have an impact on security and stability in these conflicts was a testament to 
the longevity of NATO and its effectiveness in 21
st
 century global security.  As the 
analysis indicates, the first chapter provided a useful starting point by showing the 
process of NATO decision-making and how this impacted NATO’s conduct of military 
operations.   
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The second chapter used previous NATO organizational concepts to determine 
that different tiers of NATO members provided significant contributions to conduct 
effective military operations.  The second chapter may have shown that the United States 
still played the most powerful role in the alliance and had the greatest impact in 
operations, but the research emphasized that the other member tiers could provide 
significant contributions to ensure security and stability in Kosovo and Libya.  This idea 
of tiers presents an opportunity for future research about the implications on NATO 
operations and how best to utilize members to have the most valuable impact on security 
in Europe and beyond.   
The third chapter showed a mixed record on NATO’s adaptation to non-state 
threats produced successful military operations in out-of-area conflicts.  NATO’s impact 
in securing Bosnia and the subsequent withdrawal of the IFOR/SFOR demonstrated that 
NATO could effectively adapt to changing circumstances and utilize its mechanisms to 
impact the outcome.  However, Afghanistan was a failure for NATO, particularly 
because it could not adequately implement a counterinsurgency strategy.  The research 
from this chapter, as well as pieces from chapter 1, indicated that Afghanistan was not the 
proudest moment for the alliance in its effort to adapt to the new world.  It can be argued 
that the shortcomings in Afghanistan were an anomaly in NATO’s post-Cold War 
operations, given the successful outcomes of its other operations for the past two decades.  
However, NATO needs to recalibrate its focus to more adequately deal with asymmetric 
threats like insurgencies in the future, particularly with the rise of the Islamic State.   
I am confident in the findings and argument of this thesis.  The determination of 
NATO tiers may seem too general and reflect my opinion of where the allies fit within 
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the tiers based on a combination of previous concepts.  Unfortunately, the literature on 
NATO tiers based on the allies’ level of contributions is very sparse, but the research in 
this paper can start a useful conversation to look at the tiers of NATO in order to find a 
sustainable solution to burden-sharing.  Burden-sharing will likely be a problem for the 
alliance as long as it remains in existence.  In the third chapter, one could argue that 
NATO’s failure to adapt to the non-state threat of insurgency in Afghanistan offers 
skepticism for the alliance’s future to counter non-state threats.  There is no dispute that 
NATO did not prove adept at implementing a counterinsurgency plan in Afghanistan.  
However, given NATO’s military successes in the other conflicts, the alliance showed its 
capacity to effectively project stability and security in conflicts.  This can be an argument 
in favor of NATO’s post-Cold War relevance based on its military successes.   
My intention for this thesis was to look at NATO’s effectiveness as an alliance 
following the end of the Cold War based on its military operations and how it could serve 
global security interests in a changing and complex world.  Based on the case studies, 
particularly Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya, NATO was able to use military operations to 
have a positive effect on security and stability in the region and beyond.  These conflicts 
are a positive element of NATO’s post-Cold War actions to move out-of-area and 
conduct operations outside of its original scope.  This paper can serve as a guide for 
policymakers in favor of using NATO to protect global security interests in the 21
st
 
century.   
This paper did not focus on the concepts of enlargement or Russia’s post-Cold 
War interactions with NATO, because those topics have been discussed at length by 
others and there was not more to add to the existing literature.  The thesis was more 
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focused on NATO’s actual abilities to conduct military operations and provide security to 
its members and out-of-area allies. This thesis shows NATO’s capacity to preserve 
security and maintain a role as the leading global security military alliance in the world.  
While it is too soon to tell what the outcome will be, the current situation in Ukraine 
presents exciting research opportunities for the future.  The domination of Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia could be a major security threat in the coming years and NATO will be 
called upon to take action to counter Russian aggression in the near future.  However, the 
ongoing threat from terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) also presents an opportunity to examine how NATO can successfully respond to 
this non-state threat, given its inability to implement a COIN strategy.  There is no doubt 
that this is not the end of the conversation on the NATO alliance and its ongoing role in 
protecting global security.  There will be plenty of future opportunities to discuss these 
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